{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00018645","kind":"vulnerability","title":"async-http-client: Cookie header not stripped on cross-origin redirect","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-fmxf-pm6p-7xgm","CVE-2026-45300"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client, org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-4ab233daba7eb88d2a5739fcdae11bcc"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-09T11:56:43.000Z","value":"7.4 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-4ab233daba7eb88d2a5739fcdae11bcc"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4ab233daba7eb88d2a5739fcdae11bcc","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fmxf-pm6p-7xgm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-fmxf-pm6p-7xgm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-06T20:56:39.448Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4ab233daba7eb88d2a5739fcdae11bcc"],"technology":"org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nasync-http-client leaks `Cookie` headers to cross-origin redirect targets. When following a redirect across a security boundary (different origin, or HTTPS→HTTP downgrade), the `propagatedHeaders()` method in `Redirect30xInterceptor.java` strips `Authorization` and `Proxy-Authorization` headers but does not strip `Cookie`, so session cookies and other sensitive cookie values are forwarded to the redirect target — which may be attacker-controlled.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability is in `client/src/main/java/org/asynchttpclient/netty/handler/intercept/Redirect30xInterceptor.java`.\n\nThe caller computes `stripAuth` on each redirect:\n\n```java\nboolean sameBase    = request.getUri().isSameBase(newUri);\nboolean stripAuth   = !sameBase || schemeDowngrade || stripAuthorizationOnRedirect;\n// ...\nrequestBuilder.setHeaders(propagatedHeaders(request, realm, keepBody, stripAuth));\n```\n\n`stripAuth` is `true` whenever the redirect crosses an origin, downgrades the scheme, or the caller opted in via `AsyncHttpClientConfig#isStripAuthorizationOnRedirect()`.\n\nIn the vulnerable version, `propagatedHeaders()` only removes `Authorization` and `Proxy-Authorization` in that branch — `Cookie` is l","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.0.0.Beta1, < 3.0.10"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4ab233daba7eb88d2a5739fcdae11bcc"],"technology":"org.asynchttpclient:async-http-client","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nasync-http-client leaks `Cookie` headers to cross-origin redirect targets. When following a redirect across a security boundary (different origin, or HTTPS→HTTP downgrade), the `propagatedHeaders()` method in `Redirect30xInterceptor.java` strips `Authorization` and `Proxy-Authorization` headers but does not strip `Cookie`, so session cookies and other sensitive cookie values are forwarded to the redirect target — which may be attacker-controlled.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability is in `client/src/main/java/org/asynchttpclient/netty/handler/intercept/Redirect30xInterceptor.java`.\n\nThe caller computes `stripAuth` on each redirect:\n\n```java\nboolean sameBase    = request.getUri().isSameBase(newUri);\nboolean stripAuth   = !sameBase || schemeDowngrade || stripAuthorizationOnRedirect;\n// ...\nrequestBuilder.setHeaders(propagatedHeaders(request, realm, keepBody, stripAuth));\n```\n\n`stripAuth` is `true` whenever the redirect crosses an origin, downgrades the scheme, or the caller opted in via `AsyncHttpClientConfig#isStripAuthorizationOnRedirect()`.\n\nIn the vulnerable version, `propagatedHeaders()` only removes `Authorization` and `Proxy-Authorization` in that branch — `Cookie` is l","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.0.0, < 2.15.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.867Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-09T11:56:43.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-18T16:42:20.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-06T20:56:39.448Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}