{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00018650","kind":"vulnerability","title":"skillctl: Path traversal and symlink-follow in skillctl allow arbitrary file disclosure and deletion","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for skillctl. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-4b3981cb999d0d7f6328242d0bc92375"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4b3981cb999d0d7f6328242d0bc92375","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-wx3m-whqv-xv47","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-07T00:52:58.259Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4b3981cb999d0d7f6328242d0bc92375"],"technology":"skillctl","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Impact\n\n`skillctl` 0.1.0 and 0.1.1 contained four path-safety vulnerabilities that, in combination, allowed an attacker to:\n\n1. **Exfiltrate arbitrary files on the operator's machine** by publishing a malicious skills library containing a symlink inside a skill folder (e.g. `niania → /home/user/.aws/credentials`). The symlink fell through `entry.file_type().is_dir()` in `fs_util::copy_dir_all`, was dereferenced by `fs::copy`, and the target's content was copied into the project. A subsequent `skillctl push` would have published the secret to the (possibly public) library — what the reporter called \"round-trip path exfiltration\".\n\n2. **Delete arbitrary directories outside the project or library root** by crafting a `.skills.toml` with a malicious `destination` or `source_path` field. Both were deserialized as `PathBuf` with zero validation. Because `Path::join` lets an absolute right-hand side replace the base, `destination = \"/home/user/.ssh\"` made `cwd.join(...)` resolve outside the project; `..` traversal was equally unguarded. Downstream `remove_dir_all` in `replace_folder_contents` then wiped arbitrary writable directories on `skillctl pull` / `push` / `detect`. `.skills.tom","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.867Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-05T19:46:20.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-05T19:43:51.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-07T00:52:58.259Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}