{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00019670","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Trigger.dev: Blind SSRF via alert-channel webhook","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4","CVE-2026-114076"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for trigger.dev. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.5.2 for trigger.dev. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-137f7e40b265c565b78fe125f309dd9f"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-137f7e40b265c565b78fe125f309dd9f","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-q567-cr4x-96w4","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-08T01:48:25.534Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-137f7e40b265c565b78fe125f309dd9f"],"technology":"trigger.dev","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA WEBHOOK alert channel stores a user-supplied `url`. When an alert fires (deployment/run failure, error groups), the webapp server (`alertsWorker` -> `DeliverAlertService`) POSTs the HMAC-signed alert payload to that URL via `fetch(webhook.url, ...)`. The URL is never validated against a host allowlist or private-IP/metadata blocklist (a repo-wide search for `169.254`, `isPrivate`, `isLoopback`, `net.isIP`, `ssrf` returns ZERO hits), and the API route's URL field is just `z.string().optional()` (no syntax check at all). So an authenticated tenant can point the webhook at internal infrastructure or `169.254.169.254` and the multi-tenant server fetches it.\n\n### Affected\n`apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current main).\n\n### Root cause\n- Source (API route): `app/presenters/v3/ApiAlertChannelPresenter.server.ts` `ApiAlertChannelData.url = z.string().optional()` (no host validation); route `app/routes/api.v1.projects.$projectRef.alertChannels.ts` (PAT-auth).\n- Store: `app/v3/services/alerts/createAlertChannel.server.ts` persists `{url, secret, version}` verbatim.\n- Sink: `app/v3/services/alerts/deliverAlert.server.ts:973` `fetch(webhook.url, {method:\"POST\", headers:{\"x-trigger","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 0; fixed 4.5.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T08:10:35.856Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-21T10:57:22.483Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-02T22:35:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-08T01:48:25.534Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}