vulnerability / NVI-00001960 / Revision 2
FacturaScripts has Insecure Parameter Handling: Unauthorized Modification of Immutable 'nick' Field
OSV carries this publisher advisory for facturascripts/facturascripts. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.330%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.2617. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
facturascripts/facturascripts
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 2024.92.x-dev
### Summary The application fails to validate the ```nick``` parameter during a ```POST``` request to the ```EditUser``` controller. Although the UI prevents editing this field, a user can bypass this restriction using a proxy to rename any account (including the Administrator). This leads to Broken Access Control and potential Audit Log Corruption. ### Details The vulnerability exists in the user update logic. When a ```POST``` request is sent to ```/EditUser```, the backend processes the ```nick``` form-data parameter without checking if it matches the original value or if the user has the privilege to change a unique identifier that is intended to be immutable. ### PoC ***1.*** Log in to the dashboard as any user (e.g. admin user). ***2.*** Go to your Profile by clicking your username/avatar in the top right. ***3.*** Open Burp Suite and ensure Intercept is ON. ***5.*** Click the Save button in the UI. ***6.*** In Burp Suite, locate ```nick``` in the body: ***7.*** Change the value admin to Vulnerable (or any o
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-pp79-hqv6-vmc3 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-32699 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.