vulnerability / NVI-00002050 / Revision 2
Dolibarr: OS Command Injection (RCE) via MAIN_ODT_AS_PDF configuration
OSV carries this publisher advisory for dolibarr/dolibarr. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.922%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.60334. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
dolibarr/dolibarr
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 22.0.4
### Summary An authenticated administrator can execute arbitrary operating system commands by injecting a malicious payload into the `MAIN_ODT_AS_PDF` configuration constant. This vulnerability exists because the application fails to properly validate or escape the command path before passing it to the `exec()` function in the ODT to PDF conversion process. ### Details The vulnerability is located in `htdocs/includes/odtphp/odf.php`. When the system tries to convert an ODT document to PDF (e.g., in Proposals, Invoices), it constructs a shell command using the `MAIN_ODT_AS_PDF` global setting. Code snippet (`htdocs/includes/odtphp/odf.php`, approx line 930): ```php $command = getDolGlobalString('MAIN_ODT_AS_PDF').' '.escapeshellcmd($name); // ... exec($command, $output_arr, $retval); ``` While the filename `$name` is sanitized using `escapeshellcmd()`, the configuration variable `MAIN_ODT_AS_PDF` is retrieved directly from the database and concatenated at the beginning of the string. An attacker with administrative privileges can set this variable to include a command separator (like `;`) followed by arbitrary commands. ### PoC **Prerequisites:** 1. Login as an Administrator. 2.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-w5j3-8fcr-h87w ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-23500 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.