vulnerability / NVI-00002855 / Revision 2
WWBN AVideo: Missing CSRF Protection on State-Changing JSON Endpoints Enables Forced Comment Creation, Vote Manipulation, and Category Asset Deletion
OSV carries this publisher advisory for wwbn/avideo. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.115%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.01549. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
wwbn/avideo
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 29.0
## Summary Multiple AVideo JSON endpoints under `objects/` accept state-changing requests via `$_REQUEST`/`$_GET` and persist changes tied to the caller's session user, without any anti-CSRF token, origin check, or referer check. A malicious page visited by a logged-in victim can silently: 1. Cast/flip the victim's like/dislike on any comment (`objects/comments_like.json.php`). 2. Post a comment authored by the victim on any video, with attacker-chosen text (`objects/commentAddNew.json.php`). 3. Delete assets from any category (`objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php`) when the victim has category management rights. Each endpoint is reachable from a browser via a simple `` tag or form submission, so exploitation only requires the victim to load an attacker-controlled HTML resource. ## Details AVideo exposes a helper, `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` (`objects/functionsSecurity.php:138`), that rejects cross-origin requests when the `Referer`/`Origin` does not match `webSiteRootURL`. It is only invoked in one file in the tree — `objects/userUpdate.json.php:18` — and is *not* applied to the endpoints below. There is also an `isGlobalTokenValid()` helper (`objects/functi
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-x2pw-9c38-cp2j ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-40928 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.