vulnerability / NVI-00002964 / Revision 4
symfony/ux-autocomplete: Information exposure via unescaped LIKE wildcards in EntitySearchUtil
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for symfony/ux-autocomplete, symfony/ux-autocomplete. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.5 HIGH (3.1)
nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.
6.9 MEDIUM (4.0)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.531%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.4492. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
symfony/ux-autocomplete
source listed>= 2.2.0, < 2.36.0
### Description `Symfony\UX\Autocomplete\Doctrine\EntitySearchUtil::addSearchClause()` builds the `LIKE` expression used by the autocomplete endpoint by wrapping the client-supplied query in `%...%` without escaping the SQL `LIKE` wildcards (`%`, `_`, `\`). The value is passed as a bound parameter, so this is not SQL injection, but a client can send `%` to match every row or use `_` as a single-character wildcard. Because `searchable_fields` defaults to every property of the entity and the autocomplete endpoint is public by default (`BaseEntityAutocompleteType` ships with `security => false`), an unauthenticated user can turn the endpoint into a broad matcher or a blind boolean oracle against every column of the entity, including columns the application never intended to expose. ### Resolution `EntitySearchUtil` now escapes `\`, `%`, and `_` in the user-supplied query with `addcslashes()` and appends an explicit `ESCAPE '\'` clause to the generated `LIKE` expression, so those characters are matched literally. The exact-match `words_query` `IN()` branch is unchanged. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/ux/commit/725ab3d40689c91ff19ad2d01940a3
symfony/ux-autocomplete
source listed>= 3.0.0, < 3.1.0
### Description `Symfony\UX\Autocomplete\Doctrine\EntitySearchUtil::addSearchClause()` builds the `LIKE` expression used by the autocomplete endpoint by wrapping the client-supplied query in `%...%` without escaping the SQL `LIKE` wildcards (`%`, `_`, `\`). The value is passed as a bound parameter, so this is not SQL injection, but a client can send `%` to match every row or use `_` as a single-character wildcard. Because `searchable_fields` defaults to every property of the entity and the autocomplete endpoint is public by default (`BaseEntityAutocompleteType` ships with `security => false`), an unauthenticated user can turn the endpoint into a broad matcher or a blind boolean oracle against every column of the entity, including columns the application never intended to expose. ### Resolution `EntitySearchUtil` now escapes `\`, `%`, and `_` in the user-supplied query with `addcslashes()` and appends an explicit `ESCAPE '\'` clause to the generated `LIKE` expression, so those characters are matched literally. The exact-match `words_query` `IN()` branch is unchanged. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/ux/commit/725ab3d40689c91ff19ad2d01940a3
symfony/ux-autocomplete
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.36.0
### Description `Symfony\UX\Autocomplete\Doctrine\EntitySearchUtil::addSearchClause()` builds the `LIKE` expression used by the autocomplete endpoint by wrapping the client-supplied query in `%...%` without escaping the SQL `LIKE` wildcards (`%`, `_`, `\`). The value is passed as a bound parameter, so this is not SQL injection, but a client can send `%` to match every row or use `_` as a single-character wildcard. Because `searchable_fields` defaults to every property of the entity and the autocomplete endpoint is public by default (`BaseEntityAutocompleteType` ships with `security => false`), an unauthenticated user can turn the endpoint into a broad matcher or a blind boolean oracle against every column of the entity, including columns the application never intended to expose. ### Resolution `EntitySearchUtil` now escapes `\`, `%`, and `_` in the user-supplied query with `addcslashes()` and appends an explicit `ESCAPE '\'` clause to the generated `LIKE` expression, so those characters are matched literally. The exact-match `words_query` `IN()` branch is unchanged. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/ux/commit/725ab3d40689c91ff19ad2d01940a3
symfony/ux-autocomplete
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.0.0; fixed 3.1.0
### Description `Symfony\UX\Autocomplete\Doctrine\EntitySearchUtil::addSearchClause()` builds the `LIKE` expression used by the autocomplete endpoint by wrapping the client-supplied query in `%...%` without escaping the SQL `LIKE` wildcards (`%`, `_`, `\`). The value is passed as a bound parameter, so this is not SQL injection, but a client can send `%` to match every row or use `_` as a single-character wildcard. Because `searchable_fields` defaults to every property of the entity and the autocomplete endpoint is public by default (`BaseEntityAutocompleteType` ships with `security => false`), an unauthenticated user can turn the endpoint into a broad matcher or a blind boolean oracle against every column of the entity, including columns the application never intended to expose. ### Resolution `EntitySearchUtil` now escapes `\`, `%`, and `_` in the user-supplied query with `addcslashes()` and appends an explicit `ESCAPE '\'` clause to the generated `LIKE` expression, so those characters are matched literally. The exact-match `words_query` `IN()` branch is unchanged. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/ux/commit/725ab3d40689c91ff19ad2d01940a3
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.36.0 for symfony/ux-autocomplete. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.1.0 for symfony/ux-autocomplete. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-946h-jp5c-8fvh ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-946h-jp5c-8fvh ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-49211 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-49211 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 4 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.