vulnerability / NVI-00002987 / Revision 2
TYPO3 vulnerable to Improper Access Control Persisting File Abstraction Layer Entities via Data Handler
OSV carries this publisher advisory for typo3/cms-core, typo3/cms-core, typo3/cms-core, typo3/cms-core, typo3/cms-core. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.1 HIGH (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
7.1 HIGH (3.1)
nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
typo3/cms-core
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.7.57
### Problem Entities of the File Abstraction Layer (FAL) could be persisted directly via `DataHandler`. This allowed attackers to reference files in the fallback storage directly and retrieve their file names and contents. The fallback storage ("zero-storage") is used as a backward compatibility layer for files located outside properly configured file storages and within the public web root directory. Exploiting this vulnerability requires a valid backend user account. ### Solution Update to TYPO3 versions 8.7.57 ELTS, 9.5.46 ELTS, 10.4.43 ELTS, 11.5.35 LTS, 12.4.11 LTS, 13.0.1 that fix the problem described. #### ℹ️ Strong security defaults - Manual actions required When persisting entities of the File Abstraction Layer directly via DataHandler, `sys_file` entities are now denied by default, and `sys_file_reference` & `sys_file_metadata` entities are not permitted to reference files in the fallback storage anymore. When importing data from secure origins, this must be explicitly enabled in the corresponding DataHandler instance by using `$dataHandler->isImporting = true;`. ### Credits Thanks to TYPO3 core & security team member Oliver Hader who reported and fixed the issue.
typo3/cms-core
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 9.0.0; fixed 9.5.46
### Problem Entities of the File Abstraction Layer (FAL) could be persisted directly via `DataHandler`. This allowed attackers to reference files in the fallback storage directly and retrieve their file names and contents. The fallback storage ("zero-storage") is used as a backward compatibility layer for files located outside properly configured file storages and within the public web root directory. Exploiting this vulnerability requires a valid backend user account. ### Solution Update to TYPO3 versions 8.7.57 ELTS, 9.5.46 ELTS, 10.4.43 ELTS, 11.5.35 LTS, 12.4.11 LTS, 13.0.1 that fix the problem described. #### ℹ️ Strong security defaults - Manual actions required When persisting entities of the File Abstraction Layer directly via DataHandler, `sys_file` entities are now denied by default, and `sys_file_reference` & `sys_file_metadata` entities are not permitted to reference files in the fallback storage anymore. When importing data from secure origins, this must be explicitly enabled in the corresponding DataHandler instance by using `$dataHandler->isImporting = true;`. ### Credits Thanks to TYPO3 core & security team member Oliver Hader who reported and fixed the issue.
typo3/cms-core
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 10.0.0; fixed 10.4.43
### Problem Entities of the File Abstraction Layer (FAL) could be persisted directly via `DataHandler`. This allowed attackers to reference files in the fallback storage directly and retrieve their file names and contents. The fallback storage ("zero-storage") is used as a backward compatibility layer for files located outside properly configured file storages and within the public web root directory. Exploiting this vulnerability requires a valid backend user account. ### Solution Update to TYPO3 versions 8.7.57 ELTS, 9.5.46 ELTS, 10.4.43 ELTS, 11.5.35 LTS, 12.4.11 LTS, 13.0.1 that fix the problem described. #### ℹ️ Strong security defaults - Manual actions required When persisting entities of the File Abstraction Layer directly via DataHandler, `sys_file` entities are now denied by default, and `sys_file_reference` & `sys_file_metadata` entities are not permitted to reference files in the fallback storage anymore. When importing data from secure origins, this must be explicitly enabled in the corresponding DataHandler instance by using `$dataHandler->isImporting = true;`. ### Credits Thanks to TYPO3 core & security team member Oliver Hader who reported and fixed the issue.
typo3/cms-core
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 11.0.0; fixed 11.5.35
### Problem Entities of the File Abstraction Layer (FAL) could be persisted directly via `DataHandler`. This allowed attackers to reference files in the fallback storage directly and retrieve their file names and contents. The fallback storage ("zero-storage") is used as a backward compatibility layer for files located outside properly configured file storages and within the public web root directory. Exploiting this vulnerability requires a valid backend user account. ### Solution Update to TYPO3 versions 8.7.57 ELTS, 9.5.46 ELTS, 10.4.43 ELTS, 11.5.35 LTS, 12.4.11 LTS, 13.0.1 that fix the problem described. #### ℹ️ Strong security defaults - Manual actions required When persisting entities of the File Abstraction Layer directly via DataHandler, `sys_file` entities are now denied by default, and `sys_file_reference` & `sys_file_metadata` entities are not permitted to reference files in the fallback storage anymore. When importing data from secure origins, this must be explicitly enabled in the corresponding DataHandler instance by using `$dataHandler->isImporting = true;`. ### Credits Thanks to TYPO3 core & security team member Oliver Hader who reported and fixed the issue.
typo3/cms-core
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 12.0.0; fixed 12.4.11
### Problem Entities of the File Abstraction Layer (FAL) could be persisted directly via `DataHandler`. This allowed attackers to reference files in the fallback storage directly and retrieve their file names and contents. The fallback storage ("zero-storage") is used as a backward compatibility layer for files located outside properly configured file storages and within the public web root directory. Exploiting this vulnerability requires a valid backend user account. ### Solution Update to TYPO3 versions 8.7.57 ELTS, 9.5.46 ELTS, 10.4.43 ELTS, 11.5.35 LTS, 12.4.11 LTS, 13.0.1 that fix the problem described. #### ℹ️ Strong security defaults - Manual actions required When persisting entities of the File Abstraction Layer directly via DataHandler, `sys_file` entities are now denied by default, and `sys_file_reference` & `sys_file_metadata` entities are not permitted to reference files in the fallback storage anymore. When importing data from secure origins, this must be explicitly enabled in the corresponding DataHandler instance by using `$dataHandler->isImporting = true;`. ### Credits Thanks to TYPO3 core & security team member Oliver Hader who reported and fixed the issue.
typo3/cms-core
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 13.0.0; fixed 13.0.1
### Problem Entities of the File Abstraction Layer (FAL) could be persisted directly via `DataHandler`. This allowed attackers to reference files in the fallback storage directly and retrieve their file names and contents. The fallback storage ("zero-storage") is used as a backward compatibility layer for files located outside properly configured file storages and within the public web root directory. Exploiting this vulnerability requires a valid backend user account. ### Solution Update to TYPO3 versions 8.7.57 ELTS, 9.5.46 ELTS, 10.4.43 ELTS, 11.5.35 LTS, 12.4.11 LTS, 13.0.1 that fix the problem described. #### ℹ️ Strong security defaults - Manual actions required When persisting entities of the File Abstraction Layer directly via DataHandler, `sys_file` entities are now denied by default, and `sys_file_reference` & `sys_file_metadata` entities are not permitted to reference files in the fallback storage anymore. When importing data from secure origins, this must be explicitly enabled in the corresponding DataHandler instance by using `$dataHandler->isImporting = true;`. ### Credits Thanks to TYPO3 core & security team member Oliver Hader who reported and fixed the issue.
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.7.57 for typo3/cms-core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 9.5.46 for typo3/cms-core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 10.4.43 for typo3/cms-core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 11.5.35 for typo3/cms-core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 12.4.11 for typo3/cms-core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 13.0.1 for typo3/cms-core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-rj3x-wvc6-5j66 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2024-25121 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.