vulnerability / NVI-00003124 / Revision 4
Easy!Appointments disable_booking_message rendered as raw HTML on public booking page — Stored XSS
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for alextselegidis/easyappointments. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
2.6 low
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
2.6 LOW (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.223%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.12936. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
alextselegidis/easyappointments
source listed<= 1.5.2
## Summary Easy!Appointments allows administrators to define a custom "booking disabled" message through the booking settings page. That value is stored in the `disable_booking_message` setting via a rich-text editor and later passed directly to the public `booking_message` view without escaping or sanitization: ```php ``` An authenticated administrator can store HTML or JavaScript in this field, enable disabled-booking mode, and trigger stored XSS in every unauthenticated visitor who opens the public booking page. --- ## Root Cause — Step by Step Code Flow ### Step 1 — Rich text editor value stored without sanitization The booking settings page collects the message value from the Trumbowyg rich-text editor and submits it as raw HTML: ```javascript // assets/js/pages/booking_settings.js line 61-92 bookingSettings.push({ name: 'disable_booking_message', value: $disableBookingMessage.trumbowyg('html'), }); ``` ### Step 2 — Settings controller saves value verbatim The backend settings controller persists the submitted value without any HTML sanitization: ```php // application/controllers/Booking_settings.php line 76-104 $thi
alextselegidis/easyappointments
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 1.5.2
## Summary Easy!Appointments allows administrators to define a custom "booking disabled" message through the booking settings page. That value is stored in the `disable_booking_message` setting via a rich-text editor and later passed directly to the public `booking_message` view without escaping or sanitization: ```php ``` An authenticated administrator can store HTML or JavaScript in this field, enable disabled-booking mode, and trigger stored XSS in every unauthenticated visitor who opens the public booking page. --- ## Root Cause — Step by Step Code Flow ### Step 1 — Rich text editor value stored without sanitization The booking settings page collects the message value from the Trumbowyg rich-text editor and submits it as raw HTML: ```javascript // assets/js/pages/booking_settings.js line 61-92 bookingSettings.push({ name: 'disable_booking_message', value: $disableBookingMessage.trumbowyg('html'), }); ``` ### Step 2 — Settings controller saves value verbatim The backend settings controller persists the submitted value without any HTML sanitization: ```php // application/controllers/Booking_settings.php line 76-104 $thi
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-996f-334j-67g7 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-996f-334j-67g7 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-52838 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-52838 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 4 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.