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vulnerability / NVI-00003199 / Revision 5

Sylius: Cart FormComponent allows modification or deletion of an already-completed order

OSV carries this publisher advisory for sylius/sylius, sylius/sylius, sylius/sylius. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.

source listedactiveGHSA-5597-7rmh-97q5CVE-2026-53637

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

EPSS

0.363%

FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.3025. Missing scores are unknown.

As of · FIRST EPSS

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

sylius/sylius

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.0.18

### Impact A user opens the cart page in the browser. In the background, the order gets completed, e.g. an admin changes the status, or the user finalizes payment in another tab. The browser still displays the old cart: the LiveComponent is unaware the underlying order state has changed. If the user then: - **clears the cart** → `clearCart()` calls `manager->remove()` on the completed order: the order is permanently **deleted** from the database; - **removes a product** → `removeItem()` mutates an item on the completed order; - **changes quantity** → `saveCart()` overwrites data on the completed order. In all cases, the customer's order data is irreversibly corrupted or lost, even though the order has already been placed and paid for. The same vector can be triggered deliberately by an authenticated customer (keep the cart page open, complete checkout in another tab, then modify the "cart" to add quantity beyond what was paid for). ### Patches The issue is fixed in versions: 2.0.18, 2.1.15, 2.2.6 and above. ### Workarounds If users cannot update Sylius immediately, they should create a patched copy of the affected class in their application's `src/` directory and override

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

sylius/sylius

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.1.0; fixed 2.1.15

### Impact A user opens the cart page in the browser. In the background, the order gets completed, e.g. an admin changes the status, or the user finalizes payment in another tab. The browser still displays the old cart: the LiveComponent is unaware the underlying order state has changed. If the user then: - **clears the cart** → `clearCart()` calls `manager->remove()` on the completed order: the order is permanently **deleted** from the database; - **removes a product** → `removeItem()` mutates an item on the completed order; - **changes quantity** → `saveCart()` overwrites data on the completed order. In all cases, the customer's order data is irreversibly corrupted or lost, even though the order has already been placed and paid for. The same vector can be triggered deliberately by an authenticated customer (keep the cart page open, complete checkout in another tab, then modify the "cart" to add quantity beyond what was paid for). ### Patches The issue is fixed in versions: 2.0.18, 2.1.15, 2.2.6 and above. ### Workarounds If users cannot update Sylius immediately, they should create a patched copy of the affected class in their application's `src/` directory and override

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

sylius/sylius

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.2.6

### Impact A user opens the cart page in the browser. In the background, the order gets completed, e.g. an admin changes the status, or the user finalizes payment in another tab. The browser still displays the old cart: the LiveComponent is unaware the underlying order state has changed. If the user then: - **clears the cart** → `clearCart()` calls `manager->remove()` on the completed order: the order is permanently **deleted** from the database; - **removes a product** → `removeItem()` mutates an item on the completed order; - **changes quantity** → `saveCart()` overwrites data on the completed order. In all cases, the customer's order data is irreversibly corrupted or lost, even though the order has already been placed and paid for. The same vector can be triggered deliberately by an authenticated customer (keep the cart page open, complete checkout in another tab, then modify the "cart" to add quantity beyond what was paid for). ### Patches The issue is fixed in versions: 2.0.18, 2.1.15, 2.2.6 and above. ### Workarounds If users cannot update Sylius immediately, they should create a patched copy of the affected class in their application's `src/` directory and override

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.18 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  2. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.15 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  3. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.2.6 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  4. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
  • NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-5597-7rmh-97q5 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.

  2. CVE-2026-53637 ↗

    NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog

    Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.

  3. CVE-2026-53637 ↗

    FIRST EPSS · official catalog

    Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 5 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  2. Revision 4 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  3. Revision 3 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  4. Revision 2 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  5. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗