vulnerability / NVI-00003468 / Revision 3
Webauthn Framework: allowed_origins collapses URL-like origins to host-only values, bypassing exact origin validation
OSV carries this publisher advisory for web-auth/webauthn-framework, web-auth/webauthn-lib, web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.209%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.1113. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
web-auth/webauthn-framework
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.2.0; fixed 5.2.4
### Summary When `allowed_origins` is configured, `CheckAllowedOrigins` reduces URL-like values to their `host` component and accepts on host match alone. This makes exact origin policies impossible to express: scheme and port differences are silently ignored. ### Details `CheckAllowedOrigins` stores each configured allowed origin as: ```php parse_url($allowedOrigin)['host'] ?? $allowedOrigin ``` and later reduces the received `clientDataJSON.origin` the same way: ```php parse_url($C->origin)['host'] ?? $C->origin ``` If the reduced value matches, the method returns early. As a result, for the normal `allowed_origins` path, the later HTTPS check is not reached. This differs from WebAuthn Level 2, which requires verifying that `C.origin` matches the RP's origin (scheme + host + port), separately from verifying that `authData.rpIdHash` matches the expected RP ID. **Affected code:** - CheckAllowedOrigins.php **Spec references:** - [§7.1 Registering a New Credential](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#sctn-registering-a-new-cre
web-auth/webauthn-lib
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.2.0; fixed 5.2.4
### Summary When `allowed_origins` is configured, `CheckAllowedOrigins` reduces URL-like values to their `host` component and accepts on host match alone. This makes exact origin policies impossible to express: scheme and port differences are silently ignored. ### Details `CheckAllowedOrigins` stores each configured allowed origin as: ```php parse_url($allowedOrigin)['host'] ?? $allowedOrigin ``` and later reduces the received `clientDataJSON.origin` the same way: ```php parse_url($C->origin)['host'] ?? $C->origin ``` If the reduced value matches, the method returns early. As a result, for the normal `allowed_origins` path, the later HTTPS check is not reached. This differs from WebAuthn Level 2, which requires verifying that `C.origin` matches the RP's origin (scheme + host + port), separately from verifying that `authData.rpIdHash` matches the expected RP ID. **Affected code:** - CheckAllowedOrigins.php **Spec references:** - [§7.1 Registering a New Credential](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#sctn-registering-a-new-cre
web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.2.0; fixed 5.2.4
### Summary When `allowed_origins` is configured, `CheckAllowedOrigins` reduces URL-like values to their `host` component and accepts on host match alone. This makes exact origin policies impossible to express: scheme and port differences are silently ignored. ### Details `CheckAllowedOrigins` stores each configured allowed origin as: ```php parse_url($allowedOrigin)['host'] ?? $allowedOrigin ``` and later reduces the received `clientDataJSON.origin` the same way: ```php parse_url($C->origin)['host'] ?? $C->origin ``` If the reduced value matches, the method returns early. As a result, for the normal `allowed_origins` path, the later HTTPS check is not reached. This differs from WebAuthn Level 2, which requires verifying that `C.origin` matches the RP's origin (scheme + host + port), separately from verifying that `authData.rpIdHash` matches the expected RP ID. **Affected code:** - CheckAllowedOrigins.php **Spec references:** - [§7.1 Registering a New Credential](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#sctn-registering-a-new-cre
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.2.4 for web-auth/webauthn-framework. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.2.4 for web-auth/webauthn-lib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.2.4 for web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-f7pm-6hr8-7ggm ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-30964 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.