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vulnerability / NVI-00003590 / Revision 4

MantisBT Vulnerable to Privilege Escalation from Manager to Administrator

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for mantisbt/mantisbt. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-frf7-jhp9-jxm6CVE-2026-34390

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

EPSS

0.427%

FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.36999. Missing scores are unknown.

As of · FIRST EPSS

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

mantisbt/mantisbt

source listed
  • <= 2.28.1

Insufficient access control checks in _ProjectUsersAddCommand_ (used in *manage_proj_user_add.php* and REST API endpoint `PUT /project/{id}/users`) allows users having *manage_project_threshold* access level (*manager* by default) to grant project-level *administrator* access to any user (including themselves) in any Project they have *manager* rights in. The normal project-user add form does restrict the selectable access levels to the actor's own project role or below. However, the backend handler still accepts a forged higher access_level value and writes it. ### Impact Privilege escalation. The consequences of the privilege escalation are not as bad as it may sound, because having *administrator* access at Project level is effectively not very different from being *manager*, it does not actually give administrator privileges on the whole MantisBT instance. In particular, it does not let the upgraded user delete the Project or grant them any access to global administrative functions such as managing Users, Projects, Plugins, Custom Fields, etc. ### Patches - 69e0180f180ed5acf48a8d281a73683a7bf32461 ### Workarounds None ### Credits Thanks to the following security research

GitHub Advisory Database

mantisbt/mantisbt

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.28.2

Insufficient access control checks in _ProjectUsersAddCommand_ (used in *manage_proj_user_add.php* and REST API endpoint `PUT /project/{id}/users`) allows users having *manage_project_threshold* access level (*manager* by default) to grant project-level *administrator* access to any user (including themselves) in any Project they have *manager* rights in. The normal project-user add form does restrict the selectable access levels to the actor's own project role or below. However, the backend handler still accepts a forged higher access_level value and writes it. ### Impact Privilege escalation. The consequences of the privilege escalation are not as bad as it may sound, because having *administrator* access at Project level is effectively not very different from being *manager*, it does not actually give administrator privileges on the whole MantisBT instance. In particular, it does not let the upgraded user delete the Project or grant them any access to global administrative functions such as managing Users, Projects, Plugins, Custom Fields, etc. ### Patches - 69e0180f180ed5acf48a8d281a73683a7bf32461 ### Workarounds None ### Credits Thanks to the following security research

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS

  2. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.28.2 for mantisbt/mantisbt. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
  • NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-frf7-jhp9-jxm6 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. GHSA-frf7-jhp9-jxm6 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.

  3. CVE-2026-34390 ↗

    NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog

    Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.

  4. CVE-2026-34390 ↗

    FIRST EPSS · official catalog

    Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 4 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  2. Revision 3 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  3. Revision 2 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  4. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗