vulnerability / NVI-00003664 / Revision 5
shopper/framework: Authorization bypass in multiple Livewire admin components
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for shopper/framework. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.1 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
8.1 HIGH (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.258%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.17458. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
shopper/framework
source listed< 2.8.0
## Impact Multiple Livewire components in the admin panel allowed an authenticated low-privilege user to mutate data without the required permission: - Order detail Filament actions (cancel, mark paid, mark complete, capture payment, archive, start processing) were callable with `read_orders` only and did not require `edit_orders`. `capturePayment` could trigger an actual PSP capture. - Order shipments table actions (mark delivered, edit tracking) were callable with `browse_orders` only. - Sub-form Livewire components for products (Edit, Inventory, Seo, Shipping, Files) had no authorization on `store()`, so any authenticated panel user could mutate product data without `edit_products`. - `Settings/Team/Index` had no `mount()` authorization at all — any authenticated user could create roles and delete other users. - `Settings/Team/RolePermission` gated its write actions on the read-only `view_users` permission, allowing privilege escalation via the RBAC system itself. - `PaymentMethods`, `Currencies`, `Carriers` table toggles and per-record actions had no per-action permission check. - `Customers/Create::store()` re-passed a Hidden `_password` form field into the create payload.
shopper/framework
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.8.0
## Impact Multiple Livewire components in the admin panel allowed an authenticated low-privilege user to mutate data without the required permission: - Order detail Filament actions (cancel, mark paid, mark complete, capture payment, archive, start processing) were callable with `read_orders` only and did not require `edit_orders`. `capturePayment` could trigger an actual PSP capture. - Order shipments table actions (mark delivered, edit tracking) were callable with `browse_orders` only. - Sub-form Livewire components for products (Edit, Inventory, Seo, Shipping, Files) had no authorization on `store()`, so any authenticated panel user could mutate product data without `edit_products`. - `Settings/Team/Index` had no `mount()` authorization at all — any authenticated user could create roles and delete other users. - `Settings/Team/RolePermission` gated its write actions on the read-only `view_users` permission, allowing privilege escalation via the RBAC system itself. - `PaymentMethods`, `Currencies`, `Carriers` table toggles and per-record actions had no per-action permission check. - `Customers/Create::store()` re-passed a Hidden `_password` form field into the create payload.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.8.0 for shopper/framework. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-f946-9qp6-vgch ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-f946-9qp6-vgch ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-47740 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-47740 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 5 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 4 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.