vulnerability / NVI-00003682 / Revision 4
Kimai: Teamlead authorization bypass in GET /api/timesheets allows reading other users' timesheet records without being teamlead of the target
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for kimai/kimai. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.496%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.42628. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
kimai/kimai
source listed<= 2.56.0
## Summary `GET /api/timesheets?user=` (and `users[]=`) returns the targeted user's timesheet records to any caller that has the `view_other_timesheet` permission, without verifying that the caller is teamlead of any team containing the target user. The per-record endpoint `GET /api/timesheets/{id}` correctly enforces this check via `TimesheetVoter`/`RolePermissionManager::checkTeamAccessTimesheet` → `checkTeamLeadAccess`, but the list endpoint only filters projects/customers by team membership and never validates `t.user`. A `ROLE_TEAMLEAD` user can therefore enumerate any user's records — including the `rate` field — as long as those records are on a project with no team scoping (Kimai's default) or on any project that shares any team (membership, not lead) with the requester. ## Details **Root cause:** authorization mismatch between the per-record voter and the list endpoint. ### Per-record path (correct) `src/Voter/TimesheetVoter.php:138`: ```php if (!$this->permissionManager->checkTeamAccessTimesheet($subject, $user)) { return false; } return $this->permissionManager->hasRolePermission($user, $permission . '_other_timesheet'); ``` `checkTeamLeadAccess` (RoleP
kimai/kimai
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.57.0
## Summary `GET /api/timesheets?user=` (and `users[]=`) returns the targeted user's timesheet records to any caller that has the `view_other_timesheet` permission, without verifying that the caller is teamlead of any team containing the target user. The per-record endpoint `GET /api/timesheets/{id}` correctly enforces this check via `TimesheetVoter`/`RolePermissionManager::checkTeamAccessTimesheet` → `checkTeamLeadAccess`, but the list endpoint only filters projects/customers by team membership and never validates `t.user`. A `ROLE_TEAMLEAD` user can therefore enumerate any user's records — including the `rate` field — as long as those records are on a project with no team scoping (Kimai's default) or on any project that shares any team (membership, not lead) with the requester. ## Details **Root cause:** authorization mismatch between the per-record voter and the list endpoint. ### Per-record path (correct) `src/Voter/TimesheetVoter.php:138`: ```php if (!$this->permissionManager->checkTeamAccessTimesheet($subject, $user)) { return false; } return $this->permissionManager->hasRolePermission($user, $permission . '_other_timesheet'); ``` `checkTeamLeadAccess` (RoleP
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.57.0 for kimai/kimai. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-4m8q-55qv-9pwp ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-4m8q-55qv-9pwp ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-52819 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 4 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 3 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.