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vulnerability / NVI-00003952 / Revision 4

Shopware: SSRF in Media External-Link Endpoint Bypasses IP Validation

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for shopware/core, shopware/platform. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-gq96-5pfx-f4vcCVE-2026-48013

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

4.1 medium

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

EPSS

0.366%

FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.3051. Missing scores are unknown.

As of · FIRST EPSS

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

shopware/core

source listed
  • >= 6.7.0.0, < 6.7.10.1

## Summary The `/api/_action/media/external-link` endpoint allows authenticated admin users to make server-side HTTP HEAD requests to arbitrary internal IP addresses. While the parallel `uploadFromURL` flow validates target IPs against private/reserved ranges via `FileUrlValidator`, the `linkURL` flow only performs a URL format check (regex for `http://` or `https://` prefix), allowing SSRF to internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints. ## Details The vulnerability is an inconsistency between two URL-handling flows in `MediaUploadService`. **Vulnerable path** (`external-link`): `MediaUploadV2Controller::externalLink()` at `src/Core/Content/Media/Api/MediaUploadV2Controller.php:66` takes a user-supplied `url` parameter and passes it to `MediaUploadService::linkURL()` at `src/Core/Content/Media/Upload/MediaUploadService.php:134`. `linkURL()` calls `getContentSizeFromValidExternalUrl($url)` at line 159, which only validates via `validateExternalUrl()`: ```php // src/Core/Content/Media/Upload/MediaUploadService.php:207-212 public static function validateExternalUrl(string $url): void { if (!preg_match('/^https?:\/\/.+/', $url)) { throw MediaException::inv

GitHub Advisory Database

shopware/platform

source listed
  • >= 6.7.0.0, < 6.7.10.1

## Summary The `/api/_action/media/external-link` endpoint allows authenticated admin users to make server-side HTTP HEAD requests to arbitrary internal IP addresses. While the parallel `uploadFromURL` flow validates target IPs against private/reserved ranges via `FileUrlValidator`, the `linkURL` flow only performs a URL format check (regex for `http://` or `https://` prefix), allowing SSRF to internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints. ## Details The vulnerability is an inconsistency between two URL-handling flows in `MediaUploadService`. **Vulnerable path** (`external-link`): `MediaUploadV2Controller::externalLink()` at `src/Core/Content/Media/Api/MediaUploadV2Controller.php:66` takes a user-supplied `url` parameter and passes it to `MediaUploadService::linkURL()` at `src/Core/Content/Media/Upload/MediaUploadService.php:134`. `linkURL()` calls `getContentSizeFromValidExternalUrl($url)` at line 159, which only validates via `validateExternalUrl()`: ```php // src/Core/Content/Media/Upload/MediaUploadService.php:207-212 public static function validateExternalUrl(string $url): void { if (!preg_match('/^https?:\/\/.+/', $url)) { throw MediaException::inv

GitHub Advisory Database

shopware/core

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.7.0.0; fixed 6.7.10.1

## Summary The `/api/_action/media/external-link` endpoint allows authenticated admin users to make server-side HTTP HEAD requests to arbitrary internal IP addresses. While the parallel `uploadFromURL` flow validates target IPs against private/reserved ranges via `FileUrlValidator`, the `linkURL` flow only performs a URL format check (regex for `http://` or `https://` prefix), allowing SSRF to internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints. ## Details The vulnerability is an inconsistency between two URL-handling flows in `MediaUploadService`. **Vulnerable path** (`external-link`): `MediaUploadV2Controller::externalLink()` at `src/Core/Content/Media/Api/MediaUploadV2Controller.php:66` takes a user-supplied `url` parameter and passes it to `MediaUploadService::linkURL()` at `src/Core/Content/Media/Upload/MediaUploadService.php:134`. `linkURL()` calls `getContentSizeFromValidExternalUrl($url)` at line 159, which only validates via `validateExternalUrl()`: ```php // src/Core/Content/Media/Upload/MediaUploadService.php:207-212 public static function validateExternalUrl(string $url): void { if (!preg_match('/^https?:\/\/.+/', $url)) { throw MediaException::inv

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

shopware/platform

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.7.0.0; fixed 6.7.10.1

## Summary The `/api/_action/media/external-link` endpoint allows authenticated admin users to make server-side HTTP HEAD requests to arbitrary internal IP addresses. While the parallel `uploadFromURL` flow validates target IPs against private/reserved ranges via `FileUrlValidator`, the `linkURL` flow only performs a URL format check (regex for `http://` or `https://` prefix), allowing SSRF to internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints. ## Details The vulnerability is an inconsistency between two URL-handling flows in `MediaUploadService`. **Vulnerable path** (`external-link`): `MediaUploadV2Controller::externalLink()` at `src/Core/Content/Media/Api/MediaUploadV2Controller.php:66` takes a user-supplied `url` parameter and passes it to `MediaUploadService::linkURL()` at `src/Core/Content/Media/Upload/MediaUploadService.php:134`. `linkURL()` calls `getContentSizeFromValidExternalUrl($url)` at line 159, which only validates via `validateExternalUrl()`: ```php // src/Core/Content/Media/Upload/MediaUploadService.php:207-212 public static function validateExternalUrl(string $url): void { if (!preg_match('/^https?:\/\/.+/', $url)) { throw MediaException::inv

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS

  2. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.7.10.1 for shopware/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  3. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.7.10.1 for shopware/platform. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
  • NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-gq96-5pfx-f4vc ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. GHSA-gq96-5pfx-f4vc ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.

  3. CVE-2026-48013 ↗

    NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog

    Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.

  4. CVE-2026-48013 ↗

    FIRST EPSS · official catalog

    Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 4 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  2. Revision 3 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  3. Revision 2 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  4. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗