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vulnerability / NVI-00004421 / Revision 2

AdminNeo SQLite: multi_query Incorrect Check of Function Return Value RCE

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for adminneo-org/adminneo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-p96f-p2p2-2g3hCVE-2026-96634

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

adminneo-org/adminneo

source listed
  • < 5.5.1

### Summary This vulnerability is a patch bypass that exploits catastrophic backtracking in a regular expression used to filter ATTACH statements in AdminNeo's SQLite functionality. The original vulnerability (CVE-2021-43008) allowed authenticated users to create PHP files through SQLite ATTACH statements, achieving remote code execution. The patch introduced a regex filter to block ATTACH queries, but this filter is vulnerable to catastrophic backtracking. Originally reported by @zdi-disclosures in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-3582-q6xq-5vf7 ### Analysis **[Source]** sql.inc.php :: SQL import handler:47 ```php $query = get_file("sql_file", true, ";"); ``` > User uploads a malicious SQL file through the import form. The file content is read into the `$query` variable without any initial sanitization. **[Transform]** sql.inc.php :: SQL import handler:87 ```php // Query parsing loop that extracts individual SQL statements ``` > The uploaded SQL content is processed in a loop that splits it into individual queries. Each query `$query` is extracted for processing. **[Context]** sql.inc.php :: SQL import handler:65 ```php $space = "(?:\\s

GitHub Advisory Database

adminneo-org/adminneo

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.5.1

### Summary This vulnerability is a patch bypass that exploits catastrophic backtracking in a regular expression used to filter ATTACH statements in AdminNeo's SQLite functionality. The original vulnerability (CVE-2021-43008) allowed authenticated users to create PHP files through SQLite ATTACH statements, achieving remote code execution. The patch introduced a regex filter to block ATTACH queries, but this filter is vulnerable to catastrophic backtracking. Originally reported by @zdi-disclosures in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-3582-q6xq-5vf7 ### Analysis **[Source]** sql.inc.php :: SQL import handler:47 ```php $query = get_file("sql_file", true, ";"); ``` > User uploads a malicious SQL file through the import form. The file content is read into the `$query` variable without any initial sanitization. **[Transform]** sql.inc.php :: SQL import handler:87 ```php // Query parsing loop that extracts individual SQL statements ``` > The uploaded SQL content is processed in a loop that splits it into individual queries. Each query `$query` is extracted for processing. **[Context]** sql.inc.php :: SQL import handler:65 ```php $space = "(?:\\s

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

  2. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.5.1 for adminneo-org/adminneo. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-p96f-p2p2-2g3h ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. GHSA-p96f-p2p2-2g3h ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 2 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗