vulnerability / NVI-00004421 / Revision 2
AdminNeo SQLite: multi_query Incorrect Check of Function Return Value RCE
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for adminneo-org/adminneo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
adminneo-org/adminneo
source listed< 5.5.1
### Summary This vulnerability is a patch bypass that exploits catastrophic backtracking in a regular expression used to filter ATTACH statements in AdminNeo's SQLite functionality. The original vulnerability (CVE-2021-43008) allowed authenticated users to create PHP files through SQLite ATTACH statements, achieving remote code execution. The patch introduced a regex filter to block ATTACH queries, but this filter is vulnerable to catastrophic backtracking. Originally reported by @zdi-disclosures in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-3582-q6xq-5vf7 ### Analysis **[Source]** sql.inc.php :: SQL import handler:47 ```php $query = get_file("sql_file", true, ";"); ``` > User uploads a malicious SQL file through the import form. The file content is read into the `$query` variable without any initial sanitization. **[Transform]** sql.inc.php :: SQL import handler:87 ```php // Query parsing loop that extracts individual SQL statements ``` > The uploaded SQL content is processed in a loop that splits it into individual queries. Each query `$query` is extracted for processing. **[Context]** sql.inc.php :: SQL import handler:65 ```php $space = "(?:\\s
adminneo-org/adminneo
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.5.1
### Summary This vulnerability is a patch bypass that exploits catastrophic backtracking in a regular expression used to filter ATTACH statements in AdminNeo's SQLite functionality. The original vulnerability (CVE-2021-43008) allowed authenticated users to create PHP files through SQLite ATTACH statements, achieving remote code execution. The patch introduced a regex filter to block ATTACH queries, but this filter is vulnerable to catastrophic backtracking. Originally reported by @zdi-disclosures in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-3582-q6xq-5vf7 ### Analysis **[Source]** sql.inc.php :: SQL import handler:47 ```php $query = get_file("sql_file", true, ";"); ``` > User uploads a malicious SQL file through the import form. The file content is read into the `$query` variable without any initial sanitization. **[Transform]** sql.inc.php :: SQL import handler:87 ```php // Query parsing loop that extracts individual SQL statements ``` > The uploaded SQL content is processed in a loop that splits it into individual queries. Each query `$query` is extracted for processing. **[Context]** sql.inc.php :: SQL import handler:65 ```php $space = "(?:\\s
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.5.1 for adminneo-org/adminneo. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-p96f-p2p2-2g3h ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-p96f-p2p2-2g3h ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.