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vulnerability / NVI-00004476 / Revision 2

AdminNeo Vulnerable to XSS via Rogue MySQL Server Version String (CSP Nonce Bypass)

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for adminneo-org/adminneo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-rx7m-wxwq-vxr9CVE-2026-96632

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

adminneo-org/adminneo

source listed
  • < 5.5.1

## Summary AdminNeo inserts the database server's version string into a `` tag that carries a valid CSP nonce, without any sanitization. A rogue database server can return a crafted version string that breaks out of the JavaScript context and executes arbitrary code. Because the script tag already has a valid nonce, the browser's Content Security Policy does not block execution. No authentication is required when combined with Login CSRF. Originally reported in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-h6jr-7pr6-grgj ## Prerequisites - Target runs AdminNeo - Attacker controls a reachable MySQL server (a 80-line Python script) ## Root Cause `admin/core/Admin.php`, lines 1285-1286: ```php echo script("let autocompletion;\nwindow.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => { initSyntaxHighlighting('" . Connection::get()->getVersion() . "', '" . Connection::get()->getFlavor() . "', autocompletion); });"); ``` `script()` wraps the output in ``. Return value of `Connection::get()->getVersion()` is not escaped. ## Steps To Reproduce ### 1. Build the environment **Dockerfile** (AdminNeo): ```dockerfile FROM php:8.3

GitHub Advisory Database

adminneo-org/adminneo

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.5.1

## Summary AdminNeo inserts the database server's version string into a `` tag that carries a valid CSP nonce, without any sanitization. A rogue database server can return a crafted version string that breaks out of the JavaScript context and executes arbitrary code. Because the script tag already has a valid nonce, the browser's Content Security Policy does not block execution. No authentication is required when combined with Login CSRF. Originally reported in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-h6jr-7pr6-grgj ## Prerequisites - Target runs AdminNeo - Attacker controls a reachable MySQL server (a 80-line Python script) ## Root Cause `admin/core/Admin.php`, lines 1285-1286: ```php echo script("let autocompletion;\nwindow.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => { initSyntaxHighlighting('" . Connection::get()->getVersion() . "', '" . Connection::get()->getFlavor() . "', autocompletion); });"); ``` `script()` wraps the output in ``. Return value of `Connection::get()->getVersion()` is not escaped. ## Steps To Reproduce ### 1. Build the environment **Dockerfile** (AdminNeo): ```dockerfile FROM php:8.3

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

  2. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.5.1 for adminneo-org/adminneo. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-rx7m-wxwq-vxr9 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. GHSA-rx7m-wxwq-vxr9 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 2 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗