vulnerability / NVI-00004498 / Revision 2
AdminNeo: RCE via SQLite VACUUM INTO (ATTACH Blocklist Bypass)
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for adminneo-org/adminneo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.2 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
adminneo-org/adminneo
source listed< 5.5.1
## Summary Adminer blocks `ATTACH` queries for SQLite to prevent arbitrary file creation. However, `VACUUM INTO` is not blocked and achieves the same result: writing a database file containing attacker-controlled PHP code to any path with any extension. An authenticated SQLite user can write a web shell to the web root and execute commands. Originally reported in Adminer: GHSA-q4f2-39gr-45jh ## Root Cause sql.inc.php, line 146: ```php if (DIALECT == "sqlite" && preg_match("~^$space*+ATTACH\\b~i", $q, $match)) { // blocked } ``` Only `ATTACH` is in the blocklist. `VACUUM INTO` (available since SQLite 3.27.0) writes the entire database to a new file at an arbitrary path with an arbitrary extension. It is not checked. ## Steps To Reproduce ### 1. Login to SQLite 1. Open AdminNeo and select driver: **SQLite** 2. Login and create a new database (e.g., `stage.db`) ### 2. Inject PHP code and write the shell Navigate to **SQL command** and execute: ```sql CREATE TABLE "" (i int); VACUUM INTO '/var/www/html/shell.php'; ``` The SQLite file is written to `/var/www/html/shell.
adminneo-org/adminneo
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.5.1
## Summary Adminer blocks `ATTACH` queries for SQLite to prevent arbitrary file creation. However, `VACUUM INTO` is not blocked and achieves the same result: writing a database file containing attacker-controlled PHP code to any path with any extension. An authenticated SQLite user can write a web shell to the web root and execute commands. Originally reported in Adminer: GHSA-q4f2-39gr-45jh ## Root Cause sql.inc.php, line 146: ```php if (DIALECT == "sqlite" && preg_match("~^$space*+ATTACH\\b~i", $q, $match)) { // blocked } ``` Only `ATTACH` is in the blocklist. `VACUUM INTO` (available since SQLite 3.27.0) writes the entire database to a new file at an arbitrary path with an arbitrary extension. It is not checked. ## Steps To Reproduce ### 1. Login to SQLite 1. Open AdminNeo and select driver: **SQLite** 2. Login and create a new database (e.g., `stage.db`) ### 2. Inject PHP code and write the shell Navigate to **SQL command** and execute: ```sql CREATE TABLE "" (i int); VACUUM INTO '/var/www/html/shell.php'; ``` The SQLite file is written to `/var/www/html/shell.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.5.1 for adminneo-org/adminneo. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-q5mp-gfjf-cf2j ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-q5mp-gfjf-cf2j ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.