vulnerability / NVI-00004510 / Revision 2
AVideo: CSRF in userSavePhoto.php Allows Cross-Origin Overwrite of Authenticated Users' Profile Photos with Arbitrary Content
OSV carries this publisher advisory for wwbn/avideo. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.141%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.03378. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
wwbn/avideo
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 29.0
## Summary `objects/userSavePhoto.php` is a legacy profile-photo endpoint that accepts a base64 POST parameter and writes the decoded bytes to `videos/userPhoto/photo.png`. Its only access control is `User::isLogged()`. It does not end in `.json.php`, so it is excluded from the project's global `autoCSRFGuard` (which is suffix-scoped in `objects/include_config.php`). There is no CSRF token, no Origin/Referer check, and no MIME validation of the decoded bytes. Because AVideo's default cookie policy is `SameSite=None; Secure` on HTTPS (`objects/functionsPHP.php:227`), an attacker who lures a logged-in user to a malicious page can overwrite that user's profile photo with arbitrary bytes and also triggers a site-wide `clearCache(true)` on every forged request. ## Details Handler (`objects/userSavePhoto.php`, 51 lines total): ```php // line 12 - only access control if (!User::isLogged()) { $obj->msg = __("You must be logged"); die(json_encode($obj)); } // ... // line 29 - unvalidated base64 from POST $fileData = base64DataToImage($_POST['imgBase64']); // line 30 - deterministic filename tied to the VICTIM's session $fileName = 'photo'. User::getId().'.png'; $photoU
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-jw8g-5j46-44rp ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-43877 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.