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vulnerability / NVI-00004548 / Revision 5

Aimeos Pagible CMS vulnerable to Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via DNS rebinding in admin proxy

OSV carries this publisher advisory for aimeos/pagible. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.

source listedactiveGHSA-mmj8-wcvw-6789CVE-2026-49262

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

EPSS

0.169%

FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.06306. Missing scores are unknown.

As of · FIRST EPSS

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

aimeos/pagible

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 0.10.4

### Summary The administrative proxy route (`cmsproxy`) in Aimeos Pagible CMS is vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack via DNS Rebinding. A Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition exists between the URL validation phase and the actual HTTP request phase, allowing attackers to access internal network resources and cloud metadata endpoints. ### Details Before executing an HTTP request to fetch external content, the `AdminController::proxy` controller validates the target URL using `\Aimeos\Cms\Utils::isValidUrl($url)`. This function performs a DNS query to verify that the hostname does not resolve to private or reserved IP ranges (e.g., `127.0.0.1`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `169.254.169.254`). If the validation passes, the application proceeds to the "Use" phase, invoking Guzzle/cURL to send the request. However, Guzzle performs a *second* DNS lookup to establish the socket connection. An attacker can exploit this by setting up a malicious DNS server for a domain they control and configuring it with a TTL of 0. 1. During the validation "Check", the DNS server returns a safe, public IP. 2. During the Guzzle "Use", the DNS server returns an internal/private

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 0.10.4 for aimeos/pagible. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  2. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
  • NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-mmj8-wcvw-6789 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.

  2. CVE-2026-49262 ↗

    NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog

    Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.

  3. CVE-2026-49262 ↗

    FIRST EPSS · official catalog

    Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 5 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  2. Revision 4 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  3. Revision 3 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  4. Revision 2 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  5. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗