vulnerability / NVI-00004603 / Revision 3
Kimai has Improper Authorization in Team Member and Team Activity Assignment APIs Which Allows Expansion of Team Scope Beyond Authorized Visibility
OSV carries this publisher advisory for kimai/kimai. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
5.3 MEDIUM (4.0)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.449%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.39035. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
kimai/kimai
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.58.0
### Summary Kimai contains an authenticated improper authorization vulnerability in Team-related assignment APIs. A Teamlead who can edit their own team can use backend API endpoints to add users or activities that fall outside their intended visible or manageable scope, even when the frontend correctly hides those targets. This affects both team member assignment and team activity assignment. The issue is caused by treating "may edit this team" as equivalent to "may attach any referenced object to this team", without performing a second authorization check on the target user or activity. ### Details The issue affects at least the following API routes: - `POST /api/teams/{id}/members/{userId}` - `POST /api/teams/{id}/activities/{activityId}` In both cases, the backend checks whether the caller may edit the `Team`, but it does not verify whether the referenced `User` or `Activity` falls inside the caller's allowed management scope. For team member assignment, the frontend form correctly limits the visible user choices. In `src/Form/TeamEditForm.php`, the team edit form uses `UserType`: ```php $builder->add('users', UserType::class, [ 'label' => 'add_user.label', 'hel
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.58.0 for kimai/kimai. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-xv4r-4885-gwpg ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-52825 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-52825 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.