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vulnerability / NVI-00004659 / Revision 2

Craft CMS: save_images_Asset graphql mutation can be abused to exfiltrate AWS credentials of underlying host

OSV carries this publisher advisory for craftcms/craft, craftcms/craft. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.

source listedactiveGHSA-96pq-hxpw-rgh8CVE-2026-25492

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

craftcms/craft

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0-RC1; fixed 5.8.22

### Summary - The save_images_Asset graphql mutation allows a user to give a url of an image to download. (Url must use a domain, not a raw IP.) - Attacker sets up domain attacker.domain with an A record of something like 169.254.169.254 (special AWS metadata IP) - Attacker invokes save_images_Asset with url: http://attacker.domain/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials and filename "foo.txt" - Craft fetches sensitive information on attacker's behalf, and makes it available for download at /assets/images/foo.txt - Normal checks to verify that image is valid are bypassed because of .txt extension - Normal checks to verify that url is not an IP address are bypassed because user provided a valid domain that resolves to a sensitive internal IP address ### Details handleUpload() in src/gql/resolvers/mutations/Assets.php contains the code that processes the save_images_Asset mutation. It has some basic validation logic for the url parameter (source of the image) and filename parameter (what to save image as): ``` } elseif (!empty($fileInformation['url'])) { $url = $fileInformation['url']; // make sure the hostname is alphanumeric and not an IP address

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

craftcms/craft

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.5.0; fixed 4.16.18

### Summary - The save_images_Asset graphql mutation allows a user to give a url of an image to download. (Url must use a domain, not a raw IP.) - Attacker sets up domain attacker.domain with an A record of something like 169.254.169.254 (special AWS metadata IP) - Attacker invokes save_images_Asset with url: http://attacker.domain/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials and filename "foo.txt" - Craft fetches sensitive information on attacker's behalf, and makes it available for download at /assets/images/foo.txt - Normal checks to verify that image is valid are bypassed because of .txt extension - Normal checks to verify that url is not an IP address are bypassed because user provided a valid domain that resolves to a sensitive internal IP address ### Details handleUpload() in src/gql/resolvers/mutations/Assets.php contains the code that processes the save_images_Asset mutation. It has some basic validation logic for the url parameter (source of the image) and filename parameter (what to save image as): ``` } elseif (!empty($fileInformation['url'])) { $url = $fileInformation['url']; // make sure the hostname is alphanumeric and not an IP address

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.8.22 for craftcms/craft. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  2. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.16.18 for craftcms/craft. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  3. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
  • NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-96pq-hxpw-rgh8 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.

  2. CVE-2026-25492 ↗

    NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog

    Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 2 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  2. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗