vulnerability / NVI-00004696 / Revision 4
shopper/framework: Race condition on Discount.usage_limit allows silent over-redemption
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for shopper/cart. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
5.9 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
5.9 MEDIUM (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.239%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.1504. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
shopper/cart
source listed< 2.8.0
## Impact `CreateOrderFromCartAction::execute` previously created the `Order` row before checking and incrementing the discount's `total_use` counter. Under concurrent checkout pressure (Black Friday, flash sale, viral coupon), the global `usage_limit` was silently exceeded: orders were committed with the discount fully applied to `price_amount` while the counter blocked at `usage_limit`. The merchant had no signal that an over-redemption had occurred. A second related bug: `usage_limit_per_user` was effectively a no-op because the counter it relied on (`DiscountDetail.total_use`) was never incremented anywhere in the codebase. The per-user check therefore always saw `0` uses and validation passed regardless of how many times the same customer had previously redeemed the coupon. For `eligibility = Everyone` the per-user limit could not fire at all because the underlying `DiscountDetail` row only exists for `eligibility = Customers`. Direct financial loss: each over-redemption is a discount the merchant did not intend to grant. ## Patches Fixed in `v2.8.0`. `CreateOrderFromCartAction` now: - Reserves the discount slot atomically before the order row is created, inside the same
shopper/cart
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.8.0
## Impact `CreateOrderFromCartAction::execute` previously created the `Order` row before checking and incrementing the discount's `total_use` counter. Under concurrent checkout pressure (Black Friday, flash sale, viral coupon), the global `usage_limit` was silently exceeded: orders were committed with the discount fully applied to `price_amount` while the counter blocked at `usage_limit`. The merchant had no signal that an over-redemption had occurred. A second related bug: `usage_limit_per_user` was effectively a no-op because the counter it relied on (`DiscountDetail.total_use`) was never incremented anywhere in the codebase. The per-user check therefore always saw `0` uses and validation passed regardless of how many times the same customer had previously redeemed the coupon. For `eligibility = Everyone` the per-user limit could not fire at all because the underlying `DiscountDetail` row only exists for `eligibility = Customers`. Direct financial loss: each over-redemption is a discount the merchant did not intend to grant. ## Patches Fixed in `v2.8.0`. `CreateOrderFromCartAction` now: - Reserves the discount slot atomically before the order row is created, inside the same
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.8.0 for shopper/cart. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-9rh9-hf3w-9fgg ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-9rh9-hf3w-9fgg ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-47741 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-47741 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 4 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.