vulnerability / NVI-00004746 / Revision 2
PHP Standard Library: HTTP/2 server-side missing content-length validation enables request smuggling
OSV carries this publisher advisory for php-standard-library/h2, php-standard-library/h2, php-standard-library/php-standard-library, php-standard-library/php-standard-library. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.5 HIGH (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
php-standard-library/h2
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.1.0; fixed 6.1.2
## Impact `Psl\H2\ServerConnection` does not validate that the total bytes received in DATA frames match the `content-length` header declared in the HEADERS frame, in violation of RFC 9113 §8.1.1. A malicious client can: - Send more DATA bytes than declared, smuggling additional content past application-level size limits. - Send fewer DATA bytes than declared and close the stream early, causing applications that trust the declared length to behave incorrectly. The vulnerability is only reachable for consumers using `Psl\H2\ServerConnection` directly to accept untrusted client traffic. The high-level `Psl\HTTP\Server` is in active development and was not yet released at the time of this advisory; consumers of documented high-level PSL APIs are not affected. ## Patches Fixed in 6.1.2 and 6.2.1. - Parses and validates the `content-length` header on incoming HEADERS (server-side only — clients do not enforce this per RFC 9110 §9.3.2). - Tracks cumulative DATA frame payload length per stream. - Throws `StreamException
php-standard-library/h2
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.2.0; fixed 6.2.1
## Impact `Psl\H2\ServerConnection` does not validate that the total bytes received in DATA frames match the `content-length` header declared in the HEADERS frame, in violation of RFC 9113 §8.1.1. A malicious client can: - Send more DATA bytes than declared, smuggling additional content past application-level size limits. - Send fewer DATA bytes than declared and close the stream early, causing applications that trust the declared length to behave incorrectly. The vulnerability is only reachable for consumers using `Psl\H2\ServerConnection` directly to accept untrusted client traffic. The high-level `Psl\HTTP\Server` is in active development and was not yet released at the time of this advisory; consumers of documented high-level PSL APIs are not affected. ## Patches Fixed in 6.1.2 and 6.2.1. - Parses and validates the `content-length` header on incoming HEADERS (server-side only — clients do not enforce this per RFC 9110 §9.3.2). - Tracks cumulative DATA frame payload length per stream. - Throws `StreamException
php-standard-library/php-standard-library
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.1.0; fixed 6.1.2
## Impact `Psl\H2\ServerConnection` does not validate that the total bytes received in DATA frames match the `content-length` header declared in the HEADERS frame, in violation of RFC 9113 §8.1.1. A malicious client can: - Send more DATA bytes than declared, smuggling additional content past application-level size limits. - Send fewer DATA bytes than declared and close the stream early, causing applications that trust the declared length to behave incorrectly. The vulnerability is only reachable for consumers using `Psl\H2\ServerConnection` directly to accept untrusted client traffic. The high-level `Psl\HTTP\Server` is in active development and was not yet released at the time of this advisory; consumers of documented high-level PSL APIs are not affected. ## Patches Fixed in 6.1.2 and 6.2.1. - Parses and validates the `content-length` header on incoming HEADERS (server-side only — clients do not enforce this per RFC 9110 §9.3.2). - Tracks cumulative DATA frame payload length per stream. - Throws `StreamException
php-standard-library/php-standard-library
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.2.0; fixed 6.2.1
## Impact `Psl\H2\ServerConnection` does not validate that the total bytes received in DATA frames match the `content-length` header declared in the HEADERS frame, in violation of RFC 9113 §8.1.1. A malicious client can: - Send more DATA bytes than declared, smuggling additional content past application-level size limits. - Send fewer DATA bytes than declared and close the stream early, causing applications that trust the declared length to behave incorrectly. The vulnerability is only reachable for consumers using `Psl\H2\ServerConnection` directly to accept untrusted client traffic. The high-level `Psl\HTTP\Server` is in active development and was not yet released at the time of this advisory; consumers of documented high-level PSL APIs are not affected. ## Patches Fixed in 6.1.2 and 6.2.1. - Parses and validates the `content-length` header on incoming HEADERS (server-side only — clients do not enforce this per RFC 9110 §9.3.2). - Tracks cumulative DATA frame payload length per stream. - Throws `StreamException
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.1.2 for php-standard-library/h2. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.2.1 for php-standard-library/h2. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.1.2 for php-standard-library/php-standard-library. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.2.1 for php-standard-library/php-standard-library. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-pw9p-jvrm-f7rm ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-48979 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.