vulnerability / NVI-00004788 / Revision 2
Livewire: Authorization bypass in #[Authorize] via reordered parameter keys and #[Json] execution order
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for livewire/livewire. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.5 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
livewire/livewire
source listed>= 4.3.0, < 4.4.8
### Impact Three issues allowed actions protected by the `#[Authorize]` attribute to run against records the current user is not authorized for: 1. **Out-of-order parameter keys on actions.** `#[Authorize]` resolved a model parameter by its array key, while the action itself received parameters positionally. A request sending params as an object with reordered integer keys (e.g. `{"1": 2, "0": 1}`) could pass authorization with a record the user owns while the action received a different record. With `#[Authorize('delete', 'comment')]` on `deleteComment(Comment $comment)`, a user could delete another user's comment. 2. **The same issue on event listeners.** Methods using both `#[On]` and `#[Authorize]` with a model parameter were affected in the same way through the `__dispatch` call. 3. **`#[Json]` methods ran before authorization.** When a method had both `#[Json]` and `#[Authorize]`, the method body executed before the authorization check. The response was still a 403, but any side effects (such as database writes) had already happened. Only applications using the `#[Authorize]` attribute are affected: on methods that take model parameters (issues 1 and 2), or on `#[Json]` me
livewire/livewire
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.3.0; fixed 4.4.8
### Impact Three issues allowed actions protected by the `#[Authorize]` attribute to run against records the current user is not authorized for: 1. **Out-of-order parameter keys on actions.** `#[Authorize]` resolved a model parameter by its array key, while the action itself received parameters positionally. A request sending params as an object with reordered integer keys (e.g. `{"1": 2, "0": 1}`) could pass authorization with a record the user owns while the action received a different record. With `#[Authorize('delete', 'comment')]` on `deleteComment(Comment $comment)`, a user could delete another user's comment. 2. **The same issue on event listeners.** Methods using both `#[On]` and `#[Authorize]` with a model parameter were affected in the same way through the `__dispatch` call. 3. **`#[Json]` methods ran before authorization.** When a method had both `#[Json]` and `#[Authorize]`, the method body executed before the authorization check. The response was still a 403, but any side effects (such as database writes) had already happened. Only applications using the `#[Authorize]` attribute are affected: on methods that take model parameters (issues 1 and 2), or on `#[Json]` me
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.4.8 for livewire/livewire. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-mhf7-xp6r-6qrc ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-mhf7-xp6r-6qrc ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.