vulnerability / NVI-00004826 / Revision 2
Sylius has a Promotion Usage Limit Bypass via Race Condition
OSV carries this publisher advisory for sylius/sylius, sylius/sylius, sylius/sylius, sylius/sylius, sylius/sylius. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.2 HIGH (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
5.9 MEDIUM (3.1)
nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
sylius/sylius
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.9.12
### Impact A Time-of-Check To Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition was discovered in the promotion usage limit enforcement. The same class of vulnerability affects three independent limits: 1. **Promotion usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `Promotion` entities 2. **Coupon usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `PromotionCoupon` entities 3. **Coupon per-customer usage limit** - the per-customer redemption count on `PromotionCoupon` entities In all three cases, the eligibility check reads the `used` counter (or order count) from an in-memory Doctrine entity during validation, while the actual usage increment in `OrderPromotionsUsageModifier` happens later during order completion — with no database-level locking or atomic operations between the two phases. Because Doctrine flushes an absolute value (`SET used = 1`) rather than an atomic increment (`SET used = used + 1`), and because the affected entities lack optimistic locking, concurrent requests all read the same stale usage counts and pass the eligibility checks simultaneously. An attacker can exploit this by preparing multiple carts with the same limited-use promotion or coupon and firing simultaneous `PATCH /a
sylius/sylius
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.10.0; fixed 1.10.16
### Impact A Time-of-Check To Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition was discovered in the promotion usage limit enforcement. The same class of vulnerability affects three independent limits: 1. **Promotion usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `Promotion` entities 2. **Coupon usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `PromotionCoupon` entities 3. **Coupon per-customer usage limit** - the per-customer redemption count on `PromotionCoupon` entities In all three cases, the eligibility check reads the `used` counter (or order count) from an in-memory Doctrine entity during validation, while the actual usage increment in `OrderPromotionsUsageModifier` happens later during order completion — with no database-level locking or atomic operations between the two phases. Because Doctrine flushes an absolute value (`SET used = 1`) rather than an atomic increment (`SET used = used + 1`), and because the affected entities lack optimistic locking, concurrent requests all read the same stale usage counts and pass the eligibility checks simultaneously. An attacker can exploit this by preparing multiple carts with the same limited-use promotion or coupon and firing simultaneous `PATCH /a
sylius/sylius
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.11.0; fixed 1.11.17
### Impact A Time-of-Check To Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition was discovered in the promotion usage limit enforcement. The same class of vulnerability affects three independent limits: 1. **Promotion usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `Promotion` entities 2. **Coupon usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `PromotionCoupon` entities 3. **Coupon per-customer usage limit** - the per-customer redemption count on `PromotionCoupon` entities In all three cases, the eligibility check reads the `used` counter (or order count) from an in-memory Doctrine entity during validation, while the actual usage increment in `OrderPromotionsUsageModifier` happens later during order completion — with no database-level locking or atomic operations between the two phases. Because Doctrine flushes an absolute value (`SET used = 1`) rather than an atomic increment (`SET used = used + 1`), and because the affected entities lack optimistic locking, concurrent requests all read the same stale usage counts and pass the eligibility checks simultaneously. An attacker can exploit this by preparing multiple carts with the same limited-use promotion or coupon and firing simultaneous `PATCH /a
sylius/sylius
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.12.0; fixed 1.12.23
### Impact A Time-of-Check To Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition was discovered in the promotion usage limit enforcement. The same class of vulnerability affects three independent limits: 1. **Promotion usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `Promotion` entities 2. **Coupon usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `PromotionCoupon` entities 3. **Coupon per-customer usage limit** - the per-customer redemption count on `PromotionCoupon` entities In all three cases, the eligibility check reads the `used` counter (or order count) from an in-memory Doctrine entity during validation, while the actual usage increment in `OrderPromotionsUsageModifier` happens later during order completion — with no database-level locking or atomic operations between the two phases. Because Doctrine flushes an absolute value (`SET used = 1`) rather than an atomic increment (`SET used = used + 1`), and because the affected entities lack optimistic locking, concurrent requests all read the same stale usage counts and pass the eligibility checks simultaneously. An attacker can exploit this by preparing multiple carts with the same limited-use promotion or coupon and firing simultaneous `PATCH /a
sylius/sylius
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.13.0; fixed 1.13.15
### Impact A Time-of-Check To Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition was discovered in the promotion usage limit enforcement. The same class of vulnerability affects three independent limits: 1. **Promotion usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `Promotion` entities 2. **Coupon usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `PromotionCoupon` entities 3. **Coupon per-customer usage limit** - the per-customer redemption count on `PromotionCoupon` entities In all three cases, the eligibility check reads the `used` counter (or order count) from an in-memory Doctrine entity during validation, while the actual usage increment in `OrderPromotionsUsageModifier` happens later during order completion — with no database-level locking or atomic operations between the two phases. Because Doctrine flushes an absolute value (`SET used = 1`) rather than an atomic increment (`SET used = used + 1`), and because the affected entities lack optimistic locking, concurrent requests all read the same stale usage counts and pass the eligibility checks simultaneously. An attacker can exploit this by preparing multiple carts with the same limited-use promotion or coupon and firing simultaneous `PATCH /a
sylius/sylius
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.14.0; fixed 1.14.18
### Impact A Time-of-Check To Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition was discovered in the promotion usage limit enforcement. The same class of vulnerability affects three independent limits: 1. **Promotion usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `Promotion` entities 2. **Coupon usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `PromotionCoupon` entities 3. **Coupon per-customer usage limit** - the per-customer redemption count on `PromotionCoupon` entities In all three cases, the eligibility check reads the `used` counter (or order count) from an in-memory Doctrine entity during validation, while the actual usage increment in `OrderPromotionsUsageModifier` happens later during order completion — with no database-level locking or atomic operations between the two phases. Because Doctrine flushes an absolute value (`SET used = 1`) rather than an atomic increment (`SET used = used + 1`), and because the affected entities lack optimistic locking, concurrent requests all read the same stale usage counts and pass the eligibility checks simultaneously. An attacker can exploit this by preparing multiple carts with the same limited-use promotion or coupon and firing simultaneous `PATCH /a
sylius/sylius
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.0.16
### Impact A Time-of-Check To Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition was discovered in the promotion usage limit enforcement. The same class of vulnerability affects three independent limits: 1. **Promotion usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `Promotion` entities 2. **Coupon usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `PromotionCoupon` entities 3. **Coupon per-customer usage limit** - the per-customer redemption count on `PromotionCoupon` entities In all three cases, the eligibility check reads the `used` counter (or order count) from an in-memory Doctrine entity during validation, while the actual usage increment in `OrderPromotionsUsageModifier` happens later during order completion — with no database-level locking or atomic operations between the two phases. Because Doctrine flushes an absolute value (`SET used = 1`) rather than an atomic increment (`SET used = used + 1`), and because the affected entities lack optimistic locking, concurrent requests all read the same stale usage counts and pass the eligibility checks simultaneously. An attacker can exploit this by preparing multiple carts with the same limited-use promotion or coupon and firing simultaneous `PATCH /a
sylius/sylius
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.1.0; fixed 2.1.12
### Impact A Time-of-Check To Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition was discovered in the promotion usage limit enforcement. The same class of vulnerability affects three independent limits: 1. **Promotion usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `Promotion` entities 2. **Coupon usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `PromotionCoupon` entities 3. **Coupon per-customer usage limit** - the per-customer redemption count on `PromotionCoupon` entities In all three cases, the eligibility check reads the `used` counter (or order count) from an in-memory Doctrine entity during validation, while the actual usage increment in `OrderPromotionsUsageModifier` happens later during order completion — with no database-level locking or atomic operations between the two phases. Because Doctrine flushes an absolute value (`SET used = 1`) rather than an atomic increment (`SET used = used + 1`), and because the affected entities lack optimistic locking, concurrent requests all read the same stale usage counts and pass the eligibility checks simultaneously. An attacker can exploit this by preparing multiple carts with the same limited-use promotion or coupon and firing simultaneous `PATCH /a
sylius/sylius
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.2.3
### Impact A Time-of-Check To Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition was discovered in the promotion usage limit enforcement. The same class of vulnerability affects three independent limits: 1. **Promotion usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `Promotion` entities 2. **Coupon usage limit** - the global `used` counter on `PromotionCoupon` entities 3. **Coupon per-customer usage limit** - the per-customer redemption count on `PromotionCoupon` entities In all three cases, the eligibility check reads the `used` counter (or order count) from an in-memory Doctrine entity during validation, while the actual usage increment in `OrderPromotionsUsageModifier` happens later during order completion — with no database-level locking or atomic operations between the two phases. Because Doctrine flushes an absolute value (`SET used = 1`) rather than an atomic increment (`SET used = used + 1`), and because the affected entities lack optimistic locking, concurrent requests all read the same stale usage counts and pass the eligibility checks simultaneously. An attacker can exploit this by preparing multiple carts with the same limited-use promotion or coupon and firing simultaneous `PATCH /a
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.9.12 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.10.16 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.11.17 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.12.23 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.13.15 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.14.18 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.16 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.12 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.2.3 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-7mp4-25j8-hp5q ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-31824 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.