vulnerability / NVI-00004958 / Revision 5
AVideo's Meet plugin: `uploadRecordedVideo.json.php` derives `users_id` from the uploaded filename and calls passwordless `User->login()`, allowing any caller with the Meet shared secret to obtain a session as arbitrary users including admi
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for WWBN/AVideo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.1 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.453%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.3946. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
WWBN/AVideo
source listed<= 29.0
## Summary **Type:** Authorization-bypass via user-controlled identifier. The Meet plugin's recorded-video upload endpoint (`plugin/Meet/uploadRecordedVideo.json.php`) authenticates the caller using a single shared `Authorization: Bearer ` against `$objM->secret`. Once that check passes, the endpoint reads the *target user identifier* from the uploaded file's `name` field, instantiates a `User` object with that ID, and calls `$userObject->login(true, true)` — the no-password / encoded-password login path — committing a session for that user and emitting `Set-Cookie` headers to the caller. There is no check that the caller actually owns the requested `users_id`. **File:** `plugin/Meet/uploadRecordedVideo.json.php`, lines 56-65; secondary in `objects/user.php` `User::login()` (no-password branch at lines 1276-1310). **Root cause:** the upload handler's identity model is "service-to-service" (a Meet/Jitsi recorder posts a finished recording back to AVideo with the shared secret) but the `users_id` to credit the upload to is parsed from the FILENAME the same caller controls — `$users_id = explode('-', $_FILES['upl']['name'])[0];`. There is no signed claim, no separate proof-of
WWBN/AVideo
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 29.0
## Summary **Type:** Authorization-bypass via user-controlled identifier. The Meet plugin's recorded-video upload endpoint (`plugin/Meet/uploadRecordedVideo.json.php`) authenticates the caller using a single shared `Authorization: Bearer ` against `$objM->secret`. Once that check passes, the endpoint reads the *target user identifier* from the uploaded file's `name` field, instantiates a `User` object with that ID, and calls `$userObject->login(true, true)` — the no-password / encoded-password login path — committing a session for that user and emitting `Set-Cookie` headers to the caller. There is no check that the caller actually owns the requested `users_id`. **File:** `plugin/Meet/uploadRecordedVideo.json.php`, lines 56-65; secondary in `objects/user.php` `User::login()` (no-password branch at lines 1276-1310). **Root cause:** the upload handler's identity model is "service-to-service" (a Meet/Jitsi recorder posts a finished recording back to AVideo with the shared secret) but the `users_id` to credit the upload to is parsed from the FILENAME the same caller controls — `$users_id = explode('-', $_FILES['upl']['name'])[0];`. There is no signed claim, no separate proof-of
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-qxvm-r42f-5p8j ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-qxvm-r42f-5p8j ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-56345 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 5 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 4 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.