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vulnerability / NVI-00005103 / Revision 3

Shopware: Admin API ACL Bypass in Order State Transition Endpoints

OSV carries this publisher advisory for shopware/platform, shopware/platform, shopware/core, shopware/core. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.

source listedactiveGHSA-f8q6-3g5w-jjr6CVE-2026-48014

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

EPSS

0.389%

FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.32981. Missing scores are unknown.

As of · FIRST EPSS

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

shopware/platform

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.7.0.0; fixed 6.7.10.1

## Summary This is a vertical authorization bypass in the Admin API affecting order state transition features (`/api/_action/order/{orderId}/state/{transition}` and similar transaction/delivery transition routes). The root cause is that the transition action routes do not declare required server-side ACL privileges, allowing low-privileged users to pass the authorization boundary. As a result, authenticated users without `order:update` can still change order states, causing real security impact such as operational integrity loss, automation workflow misuse, and fulfillment/settlement/support process disruption. ## Description Shopware’s permission model requires server-side enforcement independent of UI guards. However, the dedicated order-state transition action endpoints are missing ACL metadata, so accounts without regular order update privileges can still submit transition requests that are processed by the backend. In real reproduction, the same low-privileged account receives 403 on the normal order update API, while the transition action API succeeds with 200 and updates order state in the database. The key point is that reproduction is possible through direct API calls reg

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

shopware/platform

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 6.6.10.18

## Summary This is a vertical authorization bypass in the Admin API affecting order state transition features (`/api/_action/order/{orderId}/state/{transition}` and similar transaction/delivery transition routes). The root cause is that the transition action routes do not declare required server-side ACL privileges, allowing low-privileged users to pass the authorization boundary. As a result, authenticated users without `order:update` can still change order states, causing real security impact such as operational integrity loss, automation workflow misuse, and fulfillment/settlement/support process disruption. ## Description Shopware’s permission model requires server-side enforcement independent of UI guards. However, the dedicated order-state transition action endpoints are missing ACL metadata, so accounts without regular order update privileges can still submit transition requests that are processed by the backend. In real reproduction, the same low-privileged account receives 403 on the normal order update API, while the transition action API succeeds with 200 and updates order state in the database. The key point is that reproduction is possible through direct API calls reg

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

shopware/core

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.7.0.0; fixed 6.7.10.1

## Summary This is a vertical authorization bypass in the Admin API affecting order state transition features (`/api/_action/order/{orderId}/state/{transition}` and similar transaction/delivery transition routes). The root cause is that the transition action routes do not declare required server-side ACL privileges, allowing low-privileged users to pass the authorization boundary. As a result, authenticated users without `order:update` can still change order states, causing real security impact such as operational integrity loss, automation workflow misuse, and fulfillment/settlement/support process disruption. ## Description Shopware’s permission model requires server-side enforcement independent of UI guards. However, the dedicated order-state transition action endpoints are missing ACL metadata, so accounts without regular order update privileges can still submit transition requests that are processed by the backend. In real reproduction, the same low-privileged account receives 403 on the normal order update API, while the transition action API succeeds with 200 and updates order state in the database. The key point is that reproduction is possible through direct API calls reg

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

shopware/core

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 6.6.10.18

## Summary This is a vertical authorization bypass in the Admin API affecting order state transition features (`/api/_action/order/{orderId}/state/{transition}` and similar transaction/delivery transition routes). The root cause is that the transition action routes do not declare required server-side ACL privileges, allowing low-privileged users to pass the authorization boundary. As a result, authenticated users without `order:update` can still change order states, causing real security impact such as operational integrity loss, automation workflow misuse, and fulfillment/settlement/support process disruption. ## Description Shopware’s permission model requires server-side enforcement independent of UI guards. However, the dedicated order-state transition action endpoints are missing ACL metadata, so accounts without regular order update privileges can still submit transition requests that are processed by the backend. In real reproduction, the same low-privileged account receives 403 on the normal order update API, while the transition action API succeeds with 200 and updates order state in the database. The key point is that reproduction is possible through direct API calls reg

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.7.10.1 for shopware/platform. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  2. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.6.10.18 for shopware/platform. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  3. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.7.10.1 for shopware/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  4. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.6.10.18 for shopware/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  5. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
  • NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-f8q6-3g5w-jjr6 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.

  2. CVE-2026-48014 ↗

    NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog

    Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.

  3. CVE-2026-48014 ↗

    FIRST EPSS · official catalog

    Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 3 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  2. Revision 2 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  3. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗