By Null Ventures MCP platform
Menu

vulnerability / NVI-00005133 / Revision 4

PhpSpreadsheet: XmlScanner Bypass via ISO-2022 Escape Sequences Allows XXE and Denial of Service

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-3x94-m842-937cCVE-2026-108358

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

EPSS

0.625%

FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.50104. Missing scores are unknown.

As of · FIRST EPSS

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

source listed
  • >= 4.0.0, <= 5.9.0

### Summary PhpSpreadsheet's `XmlScanner::scan()` uses a regex pattern that only accounts for NULL byte (0x00) interleaving when detecting `<!DOCTYPE`. ISO-2022 escape sequences (0x1B bytes) inserted between the characters of the pattern break the regex match entirely, allowing DOCTYPE declarations with entity definitions to pass through undetected. This enables Denial of Service via quadratic entity expansion on **all PHP versions**, and XXE/SSRF on PHP < 8.0 or when `LIBXML_NOENT` is used. Any application using PhpSpreadsheet to process user-uploaded XLSX files is affected. ### Details The vulnerability exists in `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Security/XmlScanner.php`, method `scan()`, lines 87–100. The scanner builds a regex pattern `/\0*<\0*!\0*D\0*O\0*C\0*T\0*Y\0*P\0*E\0*/` that only handles NULL byte interleaving. ISO-2022 escape sequences (e.g., `0x1B 0x28 0x42` for ISO-2022-JP) inserted between each character of `<!DOCTYPE` break the regex because it only expects optional `\0` between characters. The XLSX reader extracts XML parts from the ZIP archive and passes each through `XmlScanner::scan()` before `simplexml_load_string()`. The XML parser strips the ESC bytes during cha

GitHub Advisory Database

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

source listed
  • >= 3.3.0, <= 3.10.7

### Summary PhpSpreadsheet's `XmlScanner::scan()` uses a regex pattern that only accounts for NULL byte (0x00) interleaving when detecting `<!DOCTYPE`. ISO-2022 escape sequences (0x1B bytes) inserted between the characters of the pattern break the regex match entirely, allowing DOCTYPE declarations with entity definitions to pass through undetected. This enables Denial of Service via quadratic entity expansion on **all PHP versions**, and XXE/SSRF on PHP < 8.0 or when `LIBXML_NOENT` is used. Any application using PhpSpreadsheet to process user-uploaded XLSX files is affected. ### Details The vulnerability exists in `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Security/XmlScanner.php`, method `scan()`, lines 87–100. The scanner builds a regex pattern `/\0*<\0*!\0*D\0*O\0*C\0*T\0*Y\0*P\0*E\0*/` that only handles NULL byte interleaving. ISO-2022 escape sequences (e.g., `0x1B 0x28 0x42` for ISO-2022-JP) inserted between each character of `<!DOCTYPE` break the regex because it only expects optional `\0` between characters. The XLSX reader extracts XML parts from the ZIP archive and passes each through `XmlScanner::scan()` before `simplexml_load_string()`. The XML parser strips the ESC bytes during cha

GitHub Advisory Database

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

source listed
  • >= 2.2.0, <= 2.4.7

### Summary PhpSpreadsheet's `XmlScanner::scan()` uses a regex pattern that only accounts for NULL byte (0x00) interleaving when detecting `<!DOCTYPE`. ISO-2022 escape sequences (0x1B bytes) inserted between the characters of the pattern break the regex match entirely, allowing DOCTYPE declarations with entity definitions to pass through undetected. This enables Denial of Service via quadratic entity expansion on **all PHP versions**, and XXE/SSRF on PHP < 8.0 or when `LIBXML_NOENT` is used. Any application using PhpSpreadsheet to process user-uploaded XLSX files is affected. ### Details The vulnerability exists in `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Security/XmlScanner.php`, method `scan()`, lines 87–100. The scanner builds a regex pattern `/\0*<\0*!\0*D\0*O\0*C\0*T\0*Y\0*P\0*E\0*/` that only handles NULL byte interleaving. ISO-2022 escape sequences (e.g., `0x1B 0x28 0x42` for ISO-2022-JP) inserted between each character of `<!DOCTYPE` break the regex because it only expects optional `\0` between characters. The XLSX reader extracts XML parts from the ZIP archive and passes each through `XmlScanner::scan()` before `simplexml_load_string()`. The XML parser strips the ESC bytes during cha

GitHub Advisory Database

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

source listed
  • >= 2.0.0, <= 2.1.18

### Summary PhpSpreadsheet's `XmlScanner::scan()` uses a regex pattern that only accounts for NULL byte (0x00) interleaving when detecting `<!DOCTYPE`. ISO-2022 escape sequences (0x1B bytes) inserted between the characters of the pattern break the regex match entirely, allowing DOCTYPE declarations with entity definitions to pass through undetected. This enables Denial of Service via quadratic entity expansion on **all PHP versions**, and XXE/SSRF on PHP < 8.0 or when `LIBXML_NOENT` is used. Any application using PhpSpreadsheet to process user-uploaded XLSX files is affected. ### Details The vulnerability exists in `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Security/XmlScanner.php`, method `scan()`, lines 87–100. The scanner builds a regex pattern `/\0*<\0*!\0*D\0*O\0*C\0*T\0*Y\0*P\0*E\0*/` that only handles NULL byte interleaving. ISO-2022 escape sequences (e.g., `0x1B 0x28 0x42` for ISO-2022-JP) inserted between each character of `<!DOCTYPE` break the regex because it only expects optional `\0` between characters. The XLSX reader extracts XML parts from the ZIP archive and passes each through `XmlScanner::scan()` before `simplexml_load_string()`. The XML parser strips the ESC bytes during cha

GitHub Advisory Database

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

source listed
  • <= 1.30.6

### Summary PhpSpreadsheet's `XmlScanner::scan()` uses a regex pattern that only accounts for NULL byte (0x00) interleaving when detecting `<!DOCTYPE`. ISO-2022 escape sequences (0x1B bytes) inserted between the characters of the pattern break the regex match entirely, allowing DOCTYPE declarations with entity definitions to pass through undetected. This enables Denial of Service via quadratic entity expansion on **all PHP versions**, and XXE/SSRF on PHP < 8.0 or when `LIBXML_NOENT` is used. Any application using PhpSpreadsheet to process user-uploaded XLSX files is affected. ### Details The vulnerability exists in `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Security/XmlScanner.php`, method `scan()`, lines 87–100. The scanner builds a regex pattern `/\0*<\0*!\0*D\0*O\0*C\0*T\0*Y\0*P\0*E\0*/` that only handles NULL byte interleaving. ISO-2022 escape sequences (e.g., `0x1B 0x28 0x42` for ISO-2022-JP) inserted between each character of `<!DOCTYPE` break the regex because it only expects optional `\0` between characters. The XLSX reader extracts XML parts from the ZIP archive and passes each through `XmlScanner::scan()` before `simplexml_load_string()`. The XML parser strips the ESC bytes during cha

GitHub Advisory Database

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 5.10.0

### Summary PhpSpreadsheet's `XmlScanner::scan()` uses a regex pattern that only accounts for NULL byte (0x00) interleaving when detecting `<!DOCTYPE`. ISO-2022 escape sequences (0x1B bytes) inserted between the characters of the pattern break the regex match entirely, allowing DOCTYPE declarations with entity definitions to pass through undetected. This enables Denial of Service via quadratic entity expansion on **all PHP versions**, and XXE/SSRF on PHP < 8.0 or when `LIBXML_NOENT` is used. Any application using PhpSpreadsheet to process user-uploaded XLSX files is affected. ### Details The vulnerability exists in `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Security/XmlScanner.php`, method `scan()`, lines 87–100. The scanner builds a regex pattern `/\0*<\0*!\0*D\0*O\0*C\0*T\0*Y\0*P\0*E\0*/` that only handles NULL byte interleaving. ISO-2022 escape sequences (e.g., `0x1B 0x28 0x42` for ISO-2022-JP) inserted between each character of `<!DOCTYPE` break the regex because it only expects optional `\0` between characters. The XLSX reader extracts XML parts from the ZIP archive and passes each through `XmlScanner::scan()` before `simplexml_load_string()`. The XML parser strips the ESC bytes during cha

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.3.0; fixed 3.10.8

### Summary PhpSpreadsheet's `XmlScanner::scan()` uses a regex pattern that only accounts for NULL byte (0x00) interleaving when detecting `<!DOCTYPE`. ISO-2022 escape sequences (0x1B bytes) inserted between the characters of the pattern break the regex match entirely, allowing DOCTYPE declarations with entity definitions to pass through undetected. This enables Denial of Service via quadratic entity expansion on **all PHP versions**, and XXE/SSRF on PHP < 8.0 or when `LIBXML_NOENT` is used. Any application using PhpSpreadsheet to process user-uploaded XLSX files is affected. ### Details The vulnerability exists in `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Security/XmlScanner.php`, method `scan()`, lines 87–100. The scanner builds a regex pattern `/\0*<\0*!\0*D\0*O\0*C\0*T\0*Y\0*P\0*E\0*/` that only handles NULL byte interleaving. ISO-2022 escape sequences (e.g., `0x1B 0x28 0x42` for ISO-2022-JP) inserted between each character of `<!DOCTYPE` break the regex because it only expects optional `\0` between characters. The XLSX reader extracts XML parts from the ZIP archive and passes each through `XmlScanner::scan()` before `simplexml_load_string()`. The XML parser strips the ESC bytes during cha

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.4.8

### Summary PhpSpreadsheet's `XmlScanner::scan()` uses a regex pattern that only accounts for NULL byte (0x00) interleaving when detecting `<!DOCTYPE`. ISO-2022 escape sequences (0x1B bytes) inserted between the characters of the pattern break the regex match entirely, allowing DOCTYPE declarations with entity definitions to pass through undetected. This enables Denial of Service via quadratic entity expansion on **all PHP versions**, and XXE/SSRF on PHP < 8.0 or when `LIBXML_NOENT` is used. Any application using PhpSpreadsheet to process user-uploaded XLSX files is affected. ### Details The vulnerability exists in `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Security/XmlScanner.php`, method `scan()`, lines 87–100. The scanner builds a regex pattern `/\0*<\0*!\0*D\0*O\0*C\0*T\0*Y\0*P\0*E\0*/` that only handles NULL byte interleaving. ISO-2022 escape sequences (e.g., `0x1B 0x28 0x42` for ISO-2022-JP) inserted between each character of `<!DOCTYPE` break the regex because it only expects optional `\0` between characters. The XLSX reader extracts XML parts from the ZIP archive and passes each through `XmlScanner::scan()` before `simplexml_load_string()`. The XML parser strips the ESC bytes during cha

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.1.19

### Summary PhpSpreadsheet's `XmlScanner::scan()` uses a regex pattern that only accounts for NULL byte (0x00) interleaving when detecting `<!DOCTYPE`. ISO-2022 escape sequences (0x1B bytes) inserted between the characters of the pattern break the regex match entirely, allowing DOCTYPE declarations with entity definitions to pass through undetected. This enables Denial of Service via quadratic entity expansion on **all PHP versions**, and XXE/SSRF on PHP < 8.0 or when `LIBXML_NOENT` is used. Any application using PhpSpreadsheet to process user-uploaded XLSX files is affected. ### Details The vulnerability exists in `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Security/XmlScanner.php`, method `scan()`, lines 87–100. The scanner builds a regex pattern `/\0*<\0*!\0*D\0*O\0*C\0*T\0*Y\0*P\0*E\0*/` that only handles NULL byte interleaving. ISO-2022 escape sequences (e.g., `0x1B 0x28 0x42` for ISO-2022-JP) inserted between each character of `<!DOCTYPE` break the regex because it only expects optional `\0` between characters. The XLSX reader extracts XML parts from the ZIP archive and passes each through `XmlScanner::scan()` before `simplexml_load_string()`. The XML parser strips the ESC bytes during cha

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.30.7

### Summary PhpSpreadsheet's `XmlScanner::scan()` uses a regex pattern that only accounts for NULL byte (0x00) interleaving when detecting `<!DOCTYPE`. ISO-2022 escape sequences (0x1B bytes) inserted between the characters of the pattern break the regex match entirely, allowing DOCTYPE declarations with entity definitions to pass through undetected. This enables Denial of Service via quadratic entity expansion on **all PHP versions**, and XXE/SSRF on PHP < 8.0 or when `LIBXML_NOENT` is used. Any application using PhpSpreadsheet to process user-uploaded XLSX files is affected. ### Details The vulnerability exists in `src/PhpSpreadsheet/Reader/Security/XmlScanner.php`, method `scan()`, lines 87–100. The scanner builds a regex pattern `/\0*<\0*!\0*D\0*O\0*C\0*T\0*Y\0*P\0*E\0*/` that only handles NULL byte interleaving. ISO-2022 escape sequences (e.g., `0x1B 0x28 0x42` for ISO-2022-JP) inserted between each character of `<!DOCTYPE` break the regex because it only expects optional `\0` between characters. The XLSX reader extracts XML parts from the ZIP archive and passes each through `XmlScanner::scan()` before `simplexml_load_string()`. The XML parser strips the ESC bytes during cha

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS

  2. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.10.0 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  3. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.10.8 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  4. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.8 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  5. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.19 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  6. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.30.7 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
  • NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-3x94-m842-937c ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. GHSA-3x94-m842-937c ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.

  3. CVE-2026-108358 ↗

    NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog

    Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.

  4. CVE-2026-108358 ↗

    FIRST EPSS · official catalog

    Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 4 ·

    Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.

  2. Revision 3 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  3. Revision 2 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗