vulnerability / NVI-00005396 / Revision 2
List of order ids, number, items total and token value exposed for unauthorized uses via new API
OSV carries this publisher advisory for sylius/sylius. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.881%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.59132. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
sylius/sylius
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.9.0; fixed 1.9.5
### Impact Part of the details (order ID, order number, items total, and token value) of all placed orders were exposed to unauthorized users. If exploited properly, a few additional information like the number of items in the cart and the date of the shipping may be fetched as well. This data seems to not be crucial nor is personal data, however, could be used for sociotechnical attacks or may expose a few details about shop condition to the third parties. The data possible to aggregate are the number of processed orders or their value in the moment of time. ### Patches The problem has been patched at Sylius 1.9.5 and 1.10.0 ### Workarounds There are a few ways to fix this without updating the code. The first possible solution is to hide the problematic endpoints behind the firewall from not logged in users. In order to achieve it one has to add the configuration in `config/packages/security.yaml`: ```yaml access_control: # ... - { path: "%sylius.security.new_api_shop_regex%/orders", role: IS_AUTHENTICATED_ANONYMOUSLY, methods: [POST] } - { path: "%sylius.security.new_api_shop_regex%/orders", role: ROLE_USER, methods: [GET] } ``` This would put
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.9.5 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-rpxh-vg2x-526v ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2021-32720 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.