vulnerability / NVI-00005510 / Revision 1
Sylius PayPal Plugin allows unauthorized access to Credit card form, exposing payer name and not requiring 3DS
OSV carries this publisher advisory for sylius/paypal-plugin, sylius/paypal-plugin. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
sylius/paypal-plugin
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.0.0; fixed 1.2.4
### Impact URL to the payment page done after checkout was created with autoincremented payment id (`/pay-with-paypal/{id}`) and therefore it was easy to access for anyone, not even the order's customer. The problem was, the Credit card form has prefilled "credit card holder" field with the Customer's first and last name. Additionally, the mentioned form did not require a 3D Secure authentication, as well as did not checked the result of the 3D Secure authentication. ### Patches The problem has been patched in Sylius/PayPalPlugin **1.2.4** and **1.3.1** ### Workarounds One can override a `sylius_paypal_plugin_pay_with_paypal_form` route and change its URL parameters to (for example) `{orderToken}/{paymentId}`, then override the `Sylius\PayPalPlugin\Controller\PayWithPayPalFormAction` service, to operate on the payment taken from the repository by these 2 values. It would also require usage of custom repository method. Additionally, one could override the `@SyliusPayPalPlugin/payWithPaypal.html.twig` template, to add `contingencies: ['SCA_ALWAYS']` line in `hostedFields.submit(...)` function call (line 421). It would then have to be handled in the function callback. ### For more
sylius/paypal-plugin
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.3.0; fixed 1.3.1
### Impact URL to the payment page done after checkout was created with autoincremented payment id (`/pay-with-paypal/{id}`) and therefore it was easy to access for anyone, not even the order's customer. The problem was, the Credit card form has prefilled "credit card holder" field with the Customer's first and last name. Additionally, the mentioned form did not require a 3D Secure authentication, as well as did not checked the result of the 3D Secure authentication. ### Patches The problem has been patched in Sylius/PayPalPlugin **1.2.4** and **1.3.1** ### Workarounds One can override a `sylius_paypal_plugin_pay_with_paypal_form` route and change its URL parameters to (for example) `{orderToken}/{paymentId}`, then override the `Sylius\PayPalPlugin\Controller\PayWithPayPalFormAction` service, to operate on the payment taken from the repository by these 2 values. It would also require usage of custom repository method. Additionally, one could override the `@SyliusPayPalPlugin/payWithPaypal.html.twig` template, to add `contingencies: ['SCA_ALWAYS']` line in `hostedFields.submit(...)` function call (line 421). It would then have to be handled in the function callback. ### For more
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.2.4 for sylius/paypal-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.3.1 for sylius/paypal-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-25fx-mxc2-76g7 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.