vulnerability / NVI-00005599 / Revision 2
PHP JWT Framework: Chacha20Poly1305 key-encryption algorithm discards the Poly1305 authentication tag, performing no authentication on decryption
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for web-token/jwt-experimental, web-token/jwt-library, web-token/jwt-library, web-token/jwt-library. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
web-token/jwt-experimental
source listed<= 4.1.6
### Impact The experimental `Chacha20Poly1305` key-encryption algorithm generates the 16-byte Poly1305 authentication tag during `encryptKey()` but **discards it**: the tag is never written to the header and therefore never reaches the wire. On the receiving side, `decryptKey()` calls `openssl_decrypt('chacha20-poly1305', ...)` **without the tag argument**, which makes OpenSSL skip authentication entirely. As a result the AEAD construction is silently degraded to unauthenticated ChaCha20: a tampered encrypted CEK is accepted, and because ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, a single-byte change in the ciphertext propagates as a single-byte change in the recovered CEK with no integrity check (CWE-353 / CWE-347). An attacker on the token path can manipulate the wrapped key without detection. ### Affected configurations Applications that register `Jose\Experimental\KeyEncryption\Chacha20Poly1305` (package `web-token/jwt-experimental`) as a JWE `alg`. ### Patches `encryptKey()` now publishes the Poly1305 tag as the base64url `tag` header parameter (and asserts it is 16 bytes). `decryptKey()` requires the `tag` header, validates its length, and passes it to `openssl_decrypt()` so the tag
web-token/jwt-library
source listed< 3.4.10
### Impact The experimental `Chacha20Poly1305` key-encryption algorithm generates the 16-byte Poly1305 authentication tag during `encryptKey()` but **discards it**: the tag is never written to the header and therefore never reaches the wire. On the receiving side, `decryptKey()` calls `openssl_decrypt('chacha20-poly1305', ...)` **without the tag argument**, which makes OpenSSL skip authentication entirely. As a result the AEAD construction is silently degraded to unauthenticated ChaCha20: a tampered encrypted CEK is accepted, and because ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, a single-byte change in the ciphertext propagates as a single-byte change in the recovered CEK with no integrity check (CWE-353 / CWE-347). An attacker on the token path can manipulate the wrapped key without detection. ### Affected configurations Applications that register `Jose\Experimental\KeyEncryption\Chacha20Poly1305` (package `web-token/jwt-experimental`) as a JWE `alg`. ### Patches `encryptKey()` now publishes the Poly1305 tag as the base64url `tag` header parameter (and asserts it is 16 bytes). `decryptKey()` requires the `tag` header, validates its length, and passes it to `openssl_decrypt()` so the tag
web-token/jwt-library
source listed>= 4.0.0, < 4.0.7
### Impact The experimental `Chacha20Poly1305` key-encryption algorithm generates the 16-byte Poly1305 authentication tag during `encryptKey()` but **discards it**: the tag is never written to the header and therefore never reaches the wire. On the receiving side, `decryptKey()` calls `openssl_decrypt('chacha20-poly1305', ...)` **without the tag argument**, which makes OpenSSL skip authentication entirely. As a result the AEAD construction is silently degraded to unauthenticated ChaCha20: a tampered encrypted CEK is accepted, and because ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, a single-byte change in the ciphertext propagates as a single-byte change in the recovered CEK with no integrity check (CWE-353 / CWE-347). An attacker on the token path can manipulate the wrapped key without detection. ### Affected configurations Applications that register `Jose\Experimental\KeyEncryption\Chacha20Poly1305` (package `web-token/jwt-experimental`) as a JWE `alg`. ### Patches `encryptKey()` now publishes the Poly1305 tag as the base64url `tag` header parameter (and asserts it is 16 bytes). `decryptKey()` requires the `tag` header, validates its length, and passes it to `openssl_decrypt()` so the tag
web-token/jwt-library
source listed>= 4.1.0, < 4.1.7
### Impact The experimental `Chacha20Poly1305` key-encryption algorithm generates the 16-byte Poly1305 authentication tag during `encryptKey()` but **discards it**: the tag is never written to the header and therefore never reaches the wire. On the receiving side, `decryptKey()` calls `openssl_decrypt('chacha20-poly1305', ...)` **without the tag argument**, which makes OpenSSL skip authentication entirely. As a result the AEAD construction is silently degraded to unauthenticated ChaCha20: a tampered encrypted CEK is accepted, and because ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, a single-byte change in the ciphertext propagates as a single-byte change in the recovered CEK with no integrity check (CWE-353 / CWE-347). An attacker on the token path can manipulate the wrapped key without detection. ### Affected configurations Applications that register `Jose\Experimental\KeyEncryption\Chacha20Poly1305` (package `web-token/jwt-experimental`) as a JWE `alg`. ### Patches `encryptKey()` now publishes the Poly1305 tag as the base64url `tag` header parameter (and asserts it is 16 bytes). `decryptKey()` requires the `tag` header, validates its length, and passes it to `openssl_decrypt()` so the tag
web-token/jwt-experimental
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 4.1.6
### Impact The experimental `Chacha20Poly1305` key-encryption algorithm generates the 16-byte Poly1305 authentication tag during `encryptKey()` but **discards it**: the tag is never written to the header and therefore never reaches the wire. On the receiving side, `decryptKey()` calls `openssl_decrypt('chacha20-poly1305', ...)` **without the tag argument**, which makes OpenSSL skip authentication entirely. As a result the AEAD construction is silently degraded to unauthenticated ChaCha20: a tampered encrypted CEK is accepted, and because ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, a single-byte change in the ciphertext propagates as a single-byte change in the recovered CEK with no integrity check (CWE-353 / CWE-347). An attacker on the token path can manipulate the wrapped key without detection. ### Affected configurations Applications that register `Jose\Experimental\KeyEncryption\Chacha20Poly1305` (package `web-token/jwt-experimental`) as a JWE `alg`. ### Patches `encryptKey()` now publishes the Poly1305 tag as the base64url `tag` header parameter (and asserts it is 16 bytes). `decryptKey()` requires the `tag` header, validates its length, and passes it to `openssl_decrypt()` so the tag
web-token/jwt-library
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.4.10
### Impact The experimental `Chacha20Poly1305` key-encryption algorithm generates the 16-byte Poly1305 authentication tag during `encryptKey()` but **discards it**: the tag is never written to the header and therefore never reaches the wire. On the receiving side, `decryptKey()` calls `openssl_decrypt('chacha20-poly1305', ...)` **without the tag argument**, which makes OpenSSL skip authentication entirely. As a result the AEAD construction is silently degraded to unauthenticated ChaCha20: a tampered encrypted CEK is accepted, and because ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, a single-byte change in the ciphertext propagates as a single-byte change in the recovered CEK with no integrity check (CWE-353 / CWE-347). An attacker on the token path can manipulate the wrapped key without detection. ### Affected configurations Applications that register `Jose\Experimental\KeyEncryption\Chacha20Poly1305` (package `web-token/jwt-experimental`) as a JWE `alg`. ### Patches `encryptKey()` now publishes the Poly1305 tag as the base64url `tag` header parameter (and asserts it is 16 bytes). `decryptKey()` requires the `tag` header, validates its length, and passes it to `openssl_decrypt()` so the tag
web-token/jwt-library
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.0.7
### Impact The experimental `Chacha20Poly1305` key-encryption algorithm generates the 16-byte Poly1305 authentication tag during `encryptKey()` but **discards it**: the tag is never written to the header and therefore never reaches the wire. On the receiving side, `decryptKey()` calls `openssl_decrypt('chacha20-poly1305', ...)` **without the tag argument**, which makes OpenSSL skip authentication entirely. As a result the AEAD construction is silently degraded to unauthenticated ChaCha20: a tampered encrypted CEK is accepted, and because ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, a single-byte change in the ciphertext propagates as a single-byte change in the recovered CEK with no integrity check (CWE-353 / CWE-347). An attacker on the token path can manipulate the wrapped key without detection. ### Affected configurations Applications that register `Jose\Experimental\KeyEncryption\Chacha20Poly1305` (package `web-token/jwt-experimental`) as a JWE `alg`. ### Patches `encryptKey()` now publishes the Poly1305 tag as the base64url `tag` header parameter (and asserts it is 16 bytes). `decryptKey()` requires the `tag` header, validates its length, and passes it to `openssl_decrypt()` so the tag
web-token/jwt-library
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.0; fixed 4.1.7
### Impact The experimental `Chacha20Poly1305` key-encryption algorithm generates the 16-byte Poly1305 authentication tag during `encryptKey()` but **discards it**: the tag is never written to the header and therefore never reaches the wire. On the receiving side, `decryptKey()` calls `openssl_decrypt('chacha20-poly1305', ...)` **without the tag argument**, which makes OpenSSL skip authentication entirely. As a result the AEAD construction is silently degraded to unauthenticated ChaCha20: a tampered encrypted CEK is accepted, and because ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, a single-byte change in the ciphertext propagates as a single-byte change in the recovered CEK with no integrity check (CWE-353 / CWE-347). An attacker on the token path can manipulate the wrapped key without detection. ### Affected configurations Applications that register `Jose\Experimental\KeyEncryption\Chacha20Poly1305` (package `web-token/jwt-experimental`) as a JWE `alg`. ### Patches `encryptKey()` now publishes the Poly1305 tag as the base64url `tag` header parameter (and asserts it is 16 bytes). `decryptKey()` requires the `tag` header, validates its length, and passes it to `openssl_decrypt()` so the tag
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.4.10 for web-token/jwt-library. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.0.7 for web-token/jwt-library. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.7 for web-token/jwt-library. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-6vvh-pxr4-25r7 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-6vvh-pxr4-25r7 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.