vulnerability / NVI-00005672 / Revision 4
Craft CMS's Missing Authorization in GraphQL Address Resolver Allows Cross-Scope PII Disclosure
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for craftcms/cms, craftcms/cms. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
7.1 HIGH (4.0)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.412%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.35425. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
craftcms/cms
source listed>= 5.0.0, < 5.9.18
### Summary The GraphQL Address element resolver (src/gql/resolvers/elements/Address.php) performs no schema scope filtering on top-level queries. A GraphQL API token scoped to a single low-privilege user group can read every address in the system, including addresses belonging to users in groups the token has no authorization to access. This exposes PII, including full names, addresses, organizations, tax IDs, etc. ### Details Every GraphQL element resolver in Craft CMS applies schema scope filtering via `GqlHelper::extractAllowedEntitiesFromSchema()` when handling top-level queries, except the Address resolver. The only gate check for addresses is `canQueryUsers()` (`src/gql/queries/Address.php`, line 30), which is a binary check. It returns `true` if the token has access to *any* user group. Once past this gate, no further filtering is applied. ### PoC **Tested on:** CraftCMS 5.9.17 (fresh Docker install, PHP 8.3) **Prerequisites:** A GraphQL API token with read access to any single user group ### Environment - Two user groups: `publicUsers` (in token scope) and `internalTeam` (NOT in scope) - 5 internal executives with corporate addresses (internalTeam) - 3 public custo
craftcms/cms
source listed>= 4.0.0, < 4.17.12
### Summary The GraphQL Address element resolver (src/gql/resolvers/elements/Address.php) performs no schema scope filtering on top-level queries. A GraphQL API token scoped to a single low-privilege user group can read every address in the system, including addresses belonging to users in groups the token has no authorization to access. This exposes PII, including full names, addresses, organizations, tax IDs, etc. ### Details Every GraphQL element resolver in Craft CMS applies schema scope filtering via `GqlHelper::extractAllowedEntitiesFromSchema()` when handling top-level queries, except the Address resolver. The only gate check for addresses is `canQueryUsers()` (`src/gql/queries/Address.php`, line 30), which is a binary check. It returns `true` if the token has access to *any* user group. Once past this gate, no further filtering is applied. ### PoC **Tested on:** CraftCMS 5.9.17 (fresh Docker install, PHP 8.3) **Prerequisites:** A GraphQL API token with read access to any single user group ### Environment - Two user groups: `publicUsers` (in token scope) and `internalTeam` (NOT in scope) - 5 internal executives with corporate addresses (internalTeam) - 3 public custo
craftcms/cms
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.9.18
### Summary The GraphQL Address element resolver (src/gql/resolvers/elements/Address.php) performs no schema scope filtering on top-level queries. A GraphQL API token scoped to a single low-privilege user group can read every address in the system, including addresses belonging to users in groups the token has no authorization to access. This exposes PII, including full names, addresses, organizations, tax IDs, etc. ### Details Every GraphQL element resolver in Craft CMS applies schema scope filtering via `GqlHelper::extractAllowedEntitiesFromSchema()` when handling top-level queries, except the Address resolver. The only gate check for addresses is `canQueryUsers()` (`src/gql/queries/Address.php`, line 30), which is a binary check. It returns `true` if the token has access to *any* user group. Once past this gate, no further filtering is applied. ### PoC **Tested on:** CraftCMS 5.9.17 (fresh Docker install, PHP 8.3) **Prerequisites:** A GraphQL API token with read access to any single user group ### Environment - Two user groups: `publicUsers` (in token scope) and `internalTeam` (NOT in scope) - 5 internal executives with corporate addresses (internalTeam) - 3 public custo
craftcms/cms
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.17.12
### Summary The GraphQL Address element resolver (src/gql/resolvers/elements/Address.php) performs no schema scope filtering on top-level queries. A GraphQL API token scoped to a single low-privilege user group can read every address in the system, including addresses belonging to users in groups the token has no authorization to access. This exposes PII, including full names, addresses, organizations, tax IDs, etc. ### Details Every GraphQL element resolver in Craft CMS applies schema scope filtering via `GqlHelper::extractAllowedEntitiesFromSchema()` when handling top-level queries, except the Address resolver. The only gate check for addresses is `canQueryUsers()` (`src/gql/queries/Address.php`, line 30), which is a binary check. It returns `true` if the token has access to *any* user group. Once past this gate, no further filtering is applied. ### PoC **Tested on:** CraftCMS 5.9.17 (fresh Docker install, PHP 8.3) **Prerequisites:** A GraphQL API token with read access to any single user group ### Environment - Two user groups: `publicUsers` (in token scope) and `internalTeam` (NOT in scope) - 5 internal executives with corporate addresses (internalTeam) - 3 public custo
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.9.18 for craftcms/cms. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.17.12 for craftcms/cms. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-gj2p-p9m4-c8gw ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-gj2p-p9m4-c8gw ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-44010 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-44010 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 4 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.