vulnerability / NVI-00006034 / Revision 2
Admidio has Missing CSRF Protection on Registration Approval Actions
OSV carries this publisher advisory for admidio/admidio. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
4.5 MEDIUM (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
7.3 HIGH (3.1)
nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
admidio/admidio
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.0.8
## Summary The create_user, assign_member, and assign_user action modes in modules/registration.php approve pending user registrations via GET request without validating a CSRF token. Unlike the delete_user mode in the same file (which correctly validates the token), these three approval actions read their parameters from $_GET and perform irreversible state changes without any protection. An attacker who has submitted a pending registration can extract their own user UUID from the registration confirmation email URL, then trick any user with the rol_approve_users right into visiting a crafted URL that automatically approves the registration. This bypasses the manual registration approval workflow entirely. ## Details ### CSRF Protection Is Present for delete_user but Absent for Approval Modes File: modules/registration.php, lines 90-128 The delete_user mode validates the CSRF token (line 99), but the three approval modes do not: ```php // assign_member and assign_user: no CSRF check } elseif (in_array($getMode, array('assign_member', 'assign_user'))) { $registrationService = new RegistrationService($gDb, $getUserUUID); $message = $registrationService->assignRegistrat
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.0.8 for admidio/admidio. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. NIST National Vulnerability Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-ph84-r98x-2j22 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-34384 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.