vulnerability / NVI-00006194 / Revision 3
Admidio is Missing Authorization on Forum Topic and Post Deletion
OSV carries this publisher advisory for admidio/admidio. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.240%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.15204. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
admidio/admidio
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.0.7
## Summary The forum module in Admidio does not verify whether the current user has permission to delete forum topics or posts. Both the `topic_delete` and `post_delete` actions in `forum.php` only validate the CSRF token but perform no authorization check before calling `delete()`. Any authenticated user with forum access can delete any topic (with all its posts) or any individual post by providing its UUID. This is inconsistent with the save/edit operations, which properly check `isAdministratorForum()` and ownership before allowing modifications. ## Details ### Vulnerable Code Path 1: Topic Deletion File: `D:\bugcrowd\admidio\repo\modules\forum.php`, lines 98-108 The topic_delete handler validates CSRF but never calls `$topic->isEditable()`: ```php case 'topic_delete': // check the CSRF token of the form against the session token SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); $topic = new Topic($gDb); $topic->readDataByUuid($getTopicUUID); $topic->delete(); echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success')); break; ``` The `Topic` class has an `isEditable()` method (lines 144-164 of `ListConfiguration.php`) that properly checks `isAd
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.0.7 for admidio/admidio. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-g375-5wmp-xr78 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-32818 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.