vulnerability / NVI-00006349 / Revision 4
Snipe-IT: Stored DOM XSS via table selected-count IDs
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for snipe/snipe-it. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.1 MEDIUM (3.1)
nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.
6.3 MEDIUM (4.0)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.212%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.11561. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
snipe/snipe-it
source listed< 8.6.2
### Impact The table component derives data-selected-count-id from the component $name value. On manufacturer and supplier detail pages, stored manufacturer or supplier names are passed into affected table components as that name value. The client-side JavaScript later reads the browser-decoded data-selected-count-id, uses it as a selector, and concatenates countId.substring(1) directly into an HTML string passed to jQuery .after(). Affected commit: `b224cc636c6780386e3f73f03d1171f52ab4c37a` Example payload for a manufacturer or supplier name: `x[foo=">"]>` The issue appears to involve the following flow: Stored supplier/manufacturer name -> table component data-selected-count-id -> browser decodes the attribute -> JavaScript reads countId -> countId is used as a selector -> countId.substring(1) is concatenated into HTML -> jQuery .after() inserts attacker-controlled markup -> JavaScript executes in the victim's browser Potential impact includes arbitrary JavaScript execution in the browser of an authenticated Snipe-IT user who views the affected supplier or manufacturer detail page. If the victim has elevated privileges, this may allow access to data or
snipe/snipe-it
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 8.6.2
### Impact The table component derives data-selected-count-id from the component $name value. On manufacturer and supplier detail pages, stored manufacturer or supplier names are passed into affected table components as that name value. The client-side JavaScript later reads the browser-decoded data-selected-count-id, uses it as a selector, and concatenates countId.substring(1) directly into an HTML string passed to jQuery .after(). Affected commit: `b224cc636c6780386e3f73f03d1171f52ab4c37a` Example payload for a manufacturer or supplier name: `x[foo=">"]>` The issue appears to involve the following flow: Stored supplier/manufacturer name -> table component data-selected-count-id -> browser decodes the attribute -> JavaScript reads countId -> countId is used as a selector -> countId.substring(1) is concatenated into HTML -> jQuery .after() inserts attacker-controlled markup -> JavaScript executes in the victim's browser Potential impact includes arbitrary JavaScript execution in the browser of an authenticated Snipe-IT user who views the affected supplier or manufacturer detail page. If the victim has elevated privileges, this may allow access to data or
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.6.2 for snipe/snipe-it. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-c8qc-wf67-342w ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-c8qc-wf67-342w ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-61807 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-61807 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 4 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 3 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.