php-imap vulnerable to RCE through a directory traversal vulnerability

• ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.3.0

### Summary An unsanitized attachment filename allows any unauthenticated user to leverage a directory traversal vulnerability which results in a remote code execution vulnerability. ### Details An attacker can send an email with a malicious attachment to the inbox, which gets crawled with webklex/php-imap or webklex/laravel-imap. Prerequisite for the vulnerability is that the script stores the attachments without providing a `$filename`, or providing an unsanitized `$filename`, in `src/Attachment::save(string $path, string $filename = null)` (https://github.com/Webklex/php-imap/blob/5.2.0/src/Attachment.php#L251-L255). In this case, where no `$filename` gets passed into the `Attachment::save()` method, the package would use a series of unsanitized and insecure input values from the mail as fallback (https://github.com/Webklex/php-imap/blob/5.2.0/src/Attachment.php#L252). Even if a developer passes a `$filename` into the `Attachment::save()` method, e.g. by passing the name or filename of the mail attachment itself (from email headers), the input values never get sanitized by the package. There is also no restriction about the file extension (e.g. ".php") or the contents of a file

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

• ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.3.0

### Summary An unsanitized attachment filename allows any unauthenticated user to leverage a directory traversal vulnerability which results in a remote code execution vulnerability. ### Details An attacker can send an email with a malicious attachment to the inbox, which gets crawled with webklex/php-imap or webklex/laravel-imap. Prerequisite for the vulnerability is that the script stores the attachments without providing a `$filename`, or providing an unsanitized `$filename`, in `src/Attachment::save(string $path, string $filename = null)` (https://github.com/Webklex/php-imap/blob/5.2.0/src/Attachment.php#L251-L255). In this case, where no `$filename` gets passed into the `Attachment::save()` method, the package would use a series of unsanitized and insecure input values from the mail as fallback (https://github.com/Webklex/php-imap/blob/5.2.0/src/Attachment.php#L252). Even if a developer passes a `$filename` into the `Attachment::save()` method, e.g. by passing the name or filename of the mail attachment itself (from email headers), the input values never get sanitized by the package. There is also no restriction about the file extension (e.g. ".php") or the contents of a file

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV