vulnerability / NVI-00007075 / Revision 4
Sylius Mollie Plugin has unauthenticated IDOR that leaks order token and customer PII
OSV carries this publisher advisory for sylius/mollie-plugin, sylius/mollie-plugin, sylius/mollie-plugin. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.5 MEDIUM (3.1)
security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.
0.870%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.5886. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
sylius/mollie-plugin
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.2.8
### Impact Two unauthenticated Mollie shop endpoints look up orders by a sequential integer `orderId` with no ownership or session check. Chained, they expose customer PII. `GET /{_locale}/thank-you` (`PageRedirectController::thankYouAction`, route `sylius_mollie_shop_thank_you_page_redirect`) loads the order with `findOneBy(['id' => $orderId])` and returns a `302` whose `Location` header carries that order's `tokenValue`. Any `orderId` thus yields that order's token. A non-existent id dereferences null and returns a `500`. The handler also writes the raw `orderId` into the session. `GET /{_locale}/get-code` (`QrCodeAction::fetchQrCodeFromOrder`, route `sylius_mollie_shop_get_qr_code`) runs the same lookup and returns the order's QR code and id as JSON, ignoring the session cart; this is where the front-end got the integer id. A bad id `500`s here too. That `tokenValue` is the order's only access control. Passed to the Sylius core page `GET /{_locale}/register-after-checkout/{tokenValue}` it returns a form pre-filled with the customer's first name, last name and email. The full attack: enumerate `orderId`, read the token from the redirect, read the PII, at roughly a 1-in-71 hit
sylius/mollie-plugin
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.0.0; fixed 3.2.4
### Impact Two unauthenticated Mollie shop endpoints look up orders by a sequential integer `orderId` with no ownership or session check. Chained, they expose customer PII. `GET /{_locale}/thank-you` (`PageRedirectController::thankYouAction`, route `sylius_mollie_shop_thank_you_page_redirect`) loads the order with `findOneBy(['id' => $orderId])` and returns a `302` whose `Location` header carries that order's `tokenValue`. Any `orderId` thus yields that order's token. A non-existent id dereferences null and returns a `500`. The handler also writes the raw `orderId` into the session. `GET /{_locale}/get-code` (`QrCodeAction::fetchQrCodeFromOrder`, route `sylius_mollie_shop_get_qr_code`) runs the same lookup and returns the order's QR code and id as JSON, ignoring the session cart; this is where the front-end got the integer id. A bad id `500`s here too. That `tokenValue` is the order's only access control. Passed to the Sylius core page `GET /{_locale}/register-after-checkout/{tokenValue}` it returns a form pre-filled with the customer's first name, last name and email. The full attack: enumerate `orderId`, read the token from the redirect, read the PII, at roughly a 1-in-71 hit
sylius/mollie-plugin
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.3.0; fixed 3.3.1
### Impact Two unauthenticated Mollie shop endpoints look up orders by a sequential integer `orderId` with no ownership or session check. Chained, they expose customer PII. `GET /{_locale}/thank-you` (`PageRedirectController::thankYouAction`, route `sylius_mollie_shop_thank_you_page_redirect`) loads the order with `findOneBy(['id' => $orderId])` and returns a `302` whose `Location` header carries that order's `tokenValue`. Any `orderId` thus yields that order's token. A non-existent id dereferences null and returns a `500`. The handler also writes the raw `orderId` into the session. `GET /{_locale}/get-code` (`QrCodeAction::fetchQrCodeFromOrder`, route `sylius_mollie_shop_get_qr_code`) runs the same lookup and returns the order's QR code and id as JSON, ignoring the session cart; this is where the front-end got the integer id. A bad id `500`s here too. That `tokenValue` is the order's only access control. Passed to the Sylius core page `GET /{_locale}/register-after-checkout/{tokenValue}` it returns a form pre-filled with the customer's first name, last name and email. The full attack: enumerate `orderId`, read the token from the redirect, read the PII, at roughly a 1-in-71 hit
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.2.8 for sylius/mollie-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.2.4 for sylius/mollie-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.3.1 for sylius/mollie-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
- NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-x83g-979r-f5fh ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-68501 ↗
NIST National Vulnerability Database · official catalog
Observed . This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
- CVE-2026-68501 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 4 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.