vulnerability / NVI-00007117 / Revision 3
Kimai: Pre-2FA KIMAI_SESSION cookie grants full authenticated REST API access, bypassing TOTP
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for kimai/kimai. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.576%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.47509. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
kimai/kimai
source listed< 2.59.0
### Summary Two-factor authentication (TOTP) can be fully bypassed for the REST API. The `KIMAI_SESSION` cookie returned in the response to the login request; issued after only the password is verified, before the TOTP step; is already accepted as authenticated by every `/api/*` endpoint. So after submitting just the password, the web UI correctly holds the browser at the TOTP screen (`/en/auth/2fa`), but the cookie from that same login response can be replayed against the API to act as the user without ever entering the second factor. This affects any account with 2FA enabled and requires only the account password. ### Details #### Affected Component - The API firewall / authorization. `config/packages/security.yaml` guards the API with `{ path: '^/api', roles: IS_AUTHENTICATED }`. During 2FA the session carries a Scheb `TwoFactorToken`, which satisfies `IS_AUTHENTICATED` (it is a real, non-anonymous token). `App\API\Authentication\ApiRequestMatcher` returns `!$request->hasPreviousSession()`, so a request that carries the login session skips the stateless API firewall and is served by the main session firewall; Scheb's `TwoFactorAccessDecider::isAccessible()` then evaluates `I
kimai/kimai
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.59.0
### Summary Two-factor authentication (TOTP) can be fully bypassed for the REST API. The `KIMAI_SESSION` cookie returned in the response to the login request; issued after only the password is verified, before the TOTP step; is already accepted as authenticated by every `/api/*` endpoint. So after submitting just the password, the web UI correctly holds the browser at the TOTP screen (`/en/auth/2fa`), but the cookie from that same login response can be replayed against the API to act as the user without ever entering the second factor. This affects any account with 2FA enabled and requires only the account password. ### Details #### Affected Component - The API firewall / authorization. `config/packages/security.yaml` guards the API with `{ path: '^/api', roles: IS_AUTHENTICATED }`. During 2FA the session carries a Scheb `TwoFactorToken`, which satisfies `IS_AUTHENTICATED` (it is a real, non-anonymous token). `App\API\Authentication\ApiRequestMatcher` returns `!$request->hasPreviousSession()`, so a request that carries the login session skips the stateless API firewall and is served by the main session firewall; Scheb's `TwoFactorAccessDecider::isAccessible()` then evaluates `I
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.59.0 for kimai/kimai. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-v8hx-4vx8-wc96 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-v8hx-4vx8-wc96 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-52827 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.