vulnerability / NVI-00007218 / Revision 1
Symfony allows direct access of ESI URLs behind a trusted proxy
OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/http-kernel, symfony/http-kernel, symfony/http-kernel, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
symfony/http-kernel
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.3.19
All 2.2.X, 2.3.X, 2.4.X, and 2.5.X versions of the Symfony HttpKernel component are affected by this security issue. Your application is vulnerable only if the ESI feature is enabled and there is a proxy in front of the web application. This issue has been fixed in Symfony 2.3.19, 2.4.9, and 2.5.4. Note that no fixes are provided for Symfony 2.2 as it is not maintained anymore. Description When you enable the ESI feature and when you are using a proxy like Varnish that you configured as a trusted proxy, the `FragmentHandler` considered requests to render fragments as coming from a trusted source, even if the client was requesting them directly. Symfony can not distinguish between ESI requests done on behalf of the client by Varnish and faked fragment requests coming directly from the client. To mitigate this issue, and for not-supported Symfony versions, you can use the following workaround in your Varnish configuration (`/_fragment` being the URL path prefix configured under the `fragment` setting of the framework bundle configuration): Copy sub vcl_recv { if (req.restarts == 0 && req.url ~ "^/_fragment") { error 400; } } Resolution We do not rely on trusted I
symfony/http-kernel
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.4.0; fixed 2.4.9
All 2.2.X, 2.3.X, 2.4.X, and 2.5.X versions of the Symfony HttpKernel component are affected by this security issue. Your application is vulnerable only if the ESI feature is enabled and there is a proxy in front of the web application. This issue has been fixed in Symfony 2.3.19, 2.4.9, and 2.5.4. Note that no fixes are provided for Symfony 2.2 as it is not maintained anymore. Description When you enable the ESI feature and when you are using a proxy like Varnish that you configured as a trusted proxy, the `FragmentHandler` considered requests to render fragments as coming from a trusted source, even if the client was requesting them directly. Symfony can not distinguish between ESI requests done on behalf of the client by Varnish and faked fragment requests coming directly from the client. To mitigate this issue, and for not-supported Symfony versions, you can use the following workaround in your Varnish configuration (`/_fragment` being the URL path prefix configured under the `fragment` setting of the framework bundle configuration): Copy sub vcl_recv { if (req.restarts == 0 && req.url ~ "^/_fragment") { error 400; } } Resolution We do not rely on trusted I
symfony/http-kernel
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.5.0; fixed 2.5.4
All 2.2.X, 2.3.X, 2.4.X, and 2.5.X versions of the Symfony HttpKernel component are affected by this security issue. Your application is vulnerable only if the ESI feature is enabled and there is a proxy in front of the web application. This issue has been fixed in Symfony 2.3.19, 2.4.9, and 2.5.4. Note that no fixes are provided for Symfony 2.2 as it is not maintained anymore. Description When you enable the ESI feature and when you are using a proxy like Varnish that you configured as a trusted proxy, the `FragmentHandler` considered requests to render fragments as coming from a trusted source, even if the client was requesting them directly. Symfony can not distinguish between ESI requests done on behalf of the client by Varnish and faked fragment requests coming directly from the client. To mitigate this issue, and for not-supported Symfony versions, you can use the following workaround in your Varnish configuration (`/_fragment` being the URL path prefix configured under the `fragment` setting of the framework bundle configuration): Copy sub vcl_recv { if (req.restarts == 0 && req.url ~ "^/_fragment") { error 400; } } Resolution We do not rely on trusted I
symfony/symfony
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.3.19
All 2.2.X, 2.3.X, 2.4.X, and 2.5.X versions of the Symfony HttpKernel component are affected by this security issue. Your application is vulnerable only if the ESI feature is enabled and there is a proxy in front of the web application. This issue has been fixed in Symfony 2.3.19, 2.4.9, and 2.5.4. Note that no fixes are provided for Symfony 2.2 as it is not maintained anymore. Description When you enable the ESI feature and when you are using a proxy like Varnish that you configured as a trusted proxy, the `FragmentHandler` considered requests to render fragments as coming from a trusted source, even if the client was requesting them directly. Symfony can not distinguish between ESI requests done on behalf of the client by Varnish and faked fragment requests coming directly from the client. To mitigate this issue, and for not-supported Symfony versions, you can use the following workaround in your Varnish configuration (`/_fragment` being the URL path prefix configured under the `fragment` setting of the framework bundle configuration): Copy sub vcl_recv { if (req.restarts == 0 && req.url ~ "^/_fragment") { error 400; } } Resolution We do not rely on trusted I
symfony/symfony
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.4.0; fixed 2.4.9
All 2.2.X, 2.3.X, 2.4.X, and 2.5.X versions of the Symfony HttpKernel component are affected by this security issue. Your application is vulnerable only if the ESI feature is enabled and there is a proxy in front of the web application. This issue has been fixed in Symfony 2.3.19, 2.4.9, and 2.5.4. Note that no fixes are provided for Symfony 2.2 as it is not maintained anymore. Description When you enable the ESI feature and when you are using a proxy like Varnish that you configured as a trusted proxy, the `FragmentHandler` considered requests to render fragments as coming from a trusted source, even if the client was requesting them directly. Symfony can not distinguish between ESI requests done on behalf of the client by Varnish and faked fragment requests coming directly from the client. To mitigate this issue, and for not-supported Symfony versions, you can use the following workaround in your Varnish configuration (`/_fragment` being the URL path prefix configured under the `fragment` setting of the framework bundle configuration): Copy sub vcl_recv { if (req.restarts == 0 && req.url ~ "^/_fragment") { error 400; } } Resolution We do not rely on trusted I
symfony/symfony
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.5.0; fixed 2.5.4
All 2.2.X, 2.3.X, 2.4.X, and 2.5.X versions of the Symfony HttpKernel component are affected by this security issue. Your application is vulnerable only if the ESI feature is enabled and there is a proxy in front of the web application. This issue has been fixed in Symfony 2.3.19, 2.4.9, and 2.5.4. Note that no fixes are provided for Symfony 2.2 as it is not maintained anymore. Description When you enable the ESI feature and when you are using a proxy like Varnish that you configured as a trusted proxy, the `FragmentHandler` considered requests to render fragments as coming from a trusted source, even if the client was requesting them directly. Symfony can not distinguish between ESI requests done on behalf of the client by Varnish and faked fragment requests coming directly from the client. To mitigate this issue, and for not-supported Symfony versions, you can use the following workaround in your Varnish configuration (`/_fragment` being the URL path prefix configured under the `fragment` setting of the framework bundle configuration): Copy sub vcl_recv { if (req.restarts == 0 && req.url ~ "^/_fragment") { error 400; } } Resolution We do not rely on trusted I
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.3.19 for symfony/http-kernel. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.9 for symfony/http-kernel. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.5.4 for symfony/http-kernel. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.3.19 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.9 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.5.4 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-wvjv-p5rr-mmqm ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.