vulnerability / NVI-00007468 / Revision 2
Craft CMS: Arbitrary user password reset leading to administrator account takeover
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for craftcms/cms. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
craftcms/cms
source listed>= 5.0.0-RC1, < 5.10.8
The vulnerability allows any authenticated user to change their own password without providing the current password or having an active elevated session. It also allows the attacker to change other users’ passwords if the attacker’s account has `edit users` permission (which doesn’t allow changing others’ passwords) and lacks `Administrate users` permission (which is required to change others’ passwords). The vulnerability exists in the `elements/save` action when saving a User element. The `UserPasswordValidator` applies only a `safe` validator to the `newPassword` field without an `on` scenario restriction. This makes `newPassword` mass-assignable during the generic element save flow, completely bypassing the dedicated `users/set-password` action that enforces elevated session verification. An attacker with any authenticated session (whether it’s hijacked or a normal / low-privileged user) can change their own password, and potentially take over administrator accounts. ## Required Permissions - Access the control panel - Edit users (needed for the account takeover attack scenario) ## Impact - Any authenticated user can change their own password without providing their current
craftcms/cms
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0-RC1; fixed 5.10.8
The vulnerability allows any authenticated user to change their own password without providing the current password or having an active elevated session. It also allows the attacker to change other users’ passwords if the attacker’s account has `edit users` permission (which doesn’t allow changing others’ passwords) and lacks `Administrate users` permission (which is required to change others’ passwords). The vulnerability exists in the `elements/save` action when saving a User element. The `UserPasswordValidator` applies only a `safe` validator to the `newPassword` field without an `on` scenario restriction. This makes `newPassword` mass-assignable during the generic element save flow, completely bypassing the dedicated `users/set-password` action that enforces elevated session verification. An attacker with any authenticated session (whether it’s hijacked or a normal / low-privileged user) can change their own password, and potentially take over administrator accounts. ## Required Permissions - Access the control panel - Edit users (needed for the account takeover attack scenario) ## Impact - Any authenticated user can change their own password without providing their current
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.10.8 for craftcms/cms. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-p8x7-9vfw-p7vc ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-p8x7-9vfw-p7vc ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.