vulnerability / NVI-00007617 / Revision 3
Semantic MediaWiki has a query debug output XSS (`DebugFormatter`)
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for mediawiki/semantic-media-wiki. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
6.1 medium
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
0.283%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.20839. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
mediawiki/semantic-media-wiki
source listed<= 7.1.0
## Query debug output XSS #### Failure mode Semantic MediaWiki's query debug output (`format=debug`, or the `debug` request parameter on `Special:Ask`) is assembled by `SMW\Query\DebugFormatter` and emitted as raw HTML. Several of its sinks apply no output-context encoding, so attacker-controlled query input is reflected into the page without escaping: - `buildHTML()` echoes the re-serialized ASK query string escaping only `[`; ``, `"`, `'` pass through. - `prettifySQL()` returns the generated SQL verbatim. Query value literals are inlined into the SQL through the database layer's quoting (SQL-escaping only, no HTML encoding), so markup in a value survives. - `prettifyExplain()` echoes `EXPLAIN` output; on PostgreSQL the plan text contains the `WHERE` literals. On `Special:Ask` the resulting string is concatenated into the page and sent through `OutputPage::addHTML`, never through the MediaWiki parser or Sanitizer. No special user right is required; an anonymous request suffices. This is a reflected XSS: the payload is taken from the request and echoed in the same response. Exploitation requires the query condition to target a text/blob-typed property (whose value is re-
mediawiki/semantic-media-wiki
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 7.2.0
## Query debug output XSS #### Failure mode Semantic MediaWiki's query debug output (`format=debug`, or the `debug` request parameter on `Special:Ask`) is assembled by `SMW\Query\DebugFormatter` and emitted as raw HTML. Several of its sinks apply no output-context encoding, so attacker-controlled query input is reflected into the page without escaping: - `buildHTML()` echoes the re-serialized ASK query string escaping only `[`; ``, `"`, `'` pass through. - `prettifySQL()` returns the generated SQL verbatim. Query value literals are inlined into the SQL through the database layer's quoting (SQL-escaping only, no HTML encoding), so markup in a value survives. - `prettifyExplain()` echoes `EXPLAIN` output; on PostgreSQL the plan text contains the `WHERE` literals. On `Special:Ask` the resulting string is concatenated into the page and sent through `OutputPage::addHTML`, never through the MediaWiki parser or Sanitizer. No special user right is required; an anonymous request suffices. This is a reflected XSS: the payload is taken from the request and echoed in the same response. Exploitation requires the query condition to target a text/blob-typed property (whose value is re-
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.2.0 for mediawiki/semantic-media-wiki. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-q5fm-9mx6-44f4 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-q5fm-9mx6-44f4 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-77610 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.