vulnerability / NVI-00007654 / Revision 3
AVideo: Unauthenticated PHP session store exposed to host network via published memcached port
OSV carries this publisher advisory for wwbn/avideo. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.540%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.45452. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
wwbn/avideo
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 21.0
## Summary The official `docker-compose.yml` publishes the memcached service on host port 11211 (`0.0.0.0:11211`) with no authentication, while the Dockerfile configures PHP to store all user sessions in that memcached instance. An attacker who can reach port 11211 can read, modify, or flush session data — enabling session hijacking, admin impersonation, and mass session destruction without any application-level authentication. ## Severity **High** (CVSS 3.1: 8.1) `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` - **Attack Vector:** Network — `docker-compose.yml` binds memcached to `0.0.0.0:11211` on the host - **Attack Complexity:** High — exploitation requires port 11211 to be network-reachable, which depends on external firewall/security group configuration beyond the attacker's control - **Privileges Required:** None — memcached has no authentication mechanism enabled - **User Interaction:** None - **Scope:** Unchanged — impact is to the AVideo application's session management - **Confidentiality Impact:** High — session data includes user IDs, admin flags, email addresses, and password hashes - **Integrity Impact:** High — an attacker can modify session data to inject admin p
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-xxpw-32hf-q8v9 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-29093 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.