vulnerability / NVI-00007990 / Revision 2
Pimcore vulnerable to SQL injection via unsanitized filter value in Dependency Dao RLIKE clause
OSV carries this publisher advisory for pimcore/pimcore, pimcore/pimcore. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.509%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.43452. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
pimcore/pimcore
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 11.5.14.1
The filter query parameter in the dependency listing endpoints is JSON-decoded and the value field is concatenated directly into RLIKE clauses without sanitization or parameterized queries. Affected code in models/Dependency/Dao.php: - getFilterRequiresByPath() lines 90, 95, 100 - getFilterRequiredByPath() lines 148, 153, 158 All 6 locations use direct string concatenation like: "AND LOWER(CONCAT(o.path, o.key)) RLIKE '".$value."'" Note that $orderBy and $orderDirection in the same methods (lines 75-81) ARE properly whitelist-validated, but $value has zero sanitization. Entry points (pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle ElementController.php): - GET /admin/element/get-requires-dependencies (line 654) - GET /admin/element/get-required-by-dependencies (line 714) The controller JSON-decodes the filter query param and passes $filter['value'] straight to the Dao without any escaping. PoC (time-based blind): GET /admin/element/get-requires-dependencies?id=1&elementType=document&filter=[{"type":"string","value":"x' OR SLEEP(5)#"}] If vulnerable, the response is delayed by ~15 seconds (SLEEP runs 3 times, once per UNION arm in the inner subquery). PoC (error-based extraction):
pimcore/pimcore
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 12.0.0; fixed 12.3.3
The filter query parameter in the dependency listing endpoints is JSON-decoded and the value field is concatenated directly into RLIKE clauses without sanitization or parameterized queries. Affected code in models/Dependency/Dao.php: - getFilterRequiresByPath() lines 90, 95, 100 - getFilterRequiredByPath() lines 148, 153, 158 All 6 locations use direct string concatenation like: "AND LOWER(CONCAT(o.path, o.key)) RLIKE '".$value."'" Note that $orderBy and $orderDirection in the same methods (lines 75-81) ARE properly whitelist-validated, but $value has zero sanitization. Entry points (pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle ElementController.php): - GET /admin/element/get-requires-dependencies (line 654) - GET /admin/element/get-required-by-dependencies (line 714) The controller JSON-decodes the filter query param and passes $filter['value'] straight to the Dao without any escaping. PoC (time-based blind): GET /admin/element/get-requires-dependencies?id=1&elementType=document&filter=[{"type":"string","value":"x' OR SLEEP(5)#"}] If vulnerable, the response is delayed by ~15 seconds (SLEEP runs 3 times, once per UNION arm in the inner subquery). PoC (error-based extraction):
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 12.3.3 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-vxg3-v4p6-f3fp ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2026-27461 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.