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vulnerability / NVI-00007991 / Revision 2

Composer: GHSA-gjfg-22fp-rrxx fix bypass via symlinked package bin path

GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for composer/composer, composer/composer. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.

source listedactiveGHSA-96h3-5x6v-m776CVE-2026-59944

This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.

01 / Meaning

Why it matters

Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.

CVSS

6.1 medium

GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.

As of · GitHub Advisory Database

02 / Applicability

The affected context

Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.

composer/composer

source listed
  • >= 2.3.0, < 2.10.3

## Summary A malicious or compromised Composer package could, when installed as a dependency, cause Composer to change the permissions of a file outside that package's own directory and to register a runnable `vendor/bin` command that points at that outside file. This is a path traversal and link following issue. It is not remote code execution, the attacker gains no ability to read or receive your data directly. The risk is that a file which was readable only by its owner, but modifiable by Composer, can be made world readable and executable, which is enough to expose its contents on a shared or multi tenant host. The earlier hardening from GHSA-gjfg-22fp-rrxx can be bypassed, since it only rejected literal `..` path segments in a package's declared binaries, and was only applied in a single place during dependency resolution. ## Am I affected? You can be affected if a malicious or compromised package, including a transitive dependency, is installed in your project, and either of the following is true: - The dependency package ships one of its declared binaries as a symbolic link that resolves to a location outside the package's own directory. Nothing beyond a normal install o

GitHub Advisory Database

composer/composer

source listed
  • >= 1.0, < 2.2.30

## Summary A malicious or compromised Composer package could, when installed as a dependency, cause Composer to change the permissions of a file outside that package's own directory and to register a runnable `vendor/bin` command that points at that outside file. This is a path traversal and link following issue. It is not remote code execution, the attacker gains no ability to read or receive your data directly. The risk is that a file which was readable only by its owner, but modifiable by Composer, can be made world readable and executable, which is enough to expose its contents on a shared or multi tenant host. The earlier hardening from GHSA-gjfg-22fp-rrxx can be bypassed, since it only rejected literal `..` path segments in a package's declared binaries, and was only applied in a single place during dependency resolution. ## Am I affected? You can be affected if a malicious or compromised package, including a transitive dependency, is installed in your project, and either of the following is true: - The dependency package ships one of its declared binaries as a symbolic link that resolves to a location outside the package's own directory. Nothing beyond a normal install o

GitHub Advisory Database

composer/composer

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.3.0; fixed 2.10.3

## Summary A malicious or compromised Composer package could, when installed as a dependency, cause Composer to change the permissions of a file outside that package's own directory and to register a runnable `vendor/bin` command that points at that outside file. This is a path traversal and link following issue. It is not remote code execution, the attacker gains no ability to read or receive your data directly. The risk is that a file which was readable only by its owner, but modifiable by Composer, can be made world readable and executable, which is enough to expose its contents on a shared or multi tenant host. The earlier hardening from GHSA-gjfg-22fp-rrxx can be bypassed, since it only rejected literal `..` path segments in a package's declared binaries, and was only applied in a single place during dependency resolution. ## Am I affected? You can be affected if a malicious or compromised package, including a transitive dependency, is installed in your project, and either of the following is true: - The dependency package ships one of its declared binaries as a symbolic link that resolves to a location outside the package's own directory. Nothing beyond a normal install o

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

composer/composer

source listed
  • ECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.0; fixed 2.2.30

## Summary A malicious or compromised Composer package could, when installed as a dependency, cause Composer to change the permissions of a file outside that package's own directory and to register a runnable `vendor/bin` command that points at that outside file. This is a path traversal and link following issue. It is not remote code execution, the attacker gains no ability to read or receive your data directly. The risk is that a file which was readable only by its owner, but modifiable by Composer, can be made world readable and executable, which is enough to expose its contents on a shared or multi tenant host. The earlier hardening from GHSA-gjfg-22fp-rrxx can be bypassed, since it only rejected literal `..` path segments in a package's declared binaries, and was only applied in a single place during dependency resolution. ## Am I affected? You can be affected if a malicious or compromised package, including a transitive dependency, is installed in your project, and either of the following is true: - The dependency package ships one of its declared binaries as a symbolic link that resolves to a location outside the package's own directory. Nothing beyond a normal install o

GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

03 / Response

What to do next

  1. investigate

    Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database

  2. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.10.3 for composer/composer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

  3. vendor patch

    The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.2.30 for composer/composer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.

    Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV

A fixed release is not deployment evidence.

Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.

04 / Limits

What this report cannot establish

  • Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
Read the collection and interpretation limits ↗

05 / Provenance

Sources you can inspect

Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.

  1. GHSA-96h3-5x6v-m776 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.

  2. GHSA-96h3-5x6v-m776 ↗

    GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory

    Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.

Public revision history

Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.

  1. Revision 2 ·

    Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.

  2. Revision 1 ·

    First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.

Read the public revision data ↗

The next step is private

Bring the question into your environment.

The connected workflow is a development preview for inventory, contextual matching, owner decisions and evidence-based verification. No system-specific result is generated by this page.

See the synthetic workflow preview ↗