vulnerability / NVI-00008067 / Revision 2
Duplicate Advisory: Grav: Path Traversal in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() Allows Arbitrary File Deletion
GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for getgrav/grav. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
8.1 high
GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.
As of · GitHub Advisory Database
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
getgrav/grav
source listed< 2.0.16
### Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-jq29-c7v8-rg55. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ### Original Description Grav before 2.0.16 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() that allows authenticated users with media management permissions to delete arbitrary files by supplying filenames with directory traversal sequences. The method validates only the basename portion of the filename while preserving unvalidated directory paths containing ../ sequences that are passed to unlink(), enabling deletion of files outside the intended media storage directory.
getgrav/grav
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0
### Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-jq29-c7v8-rg55. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ### Original Description Grav before 2.0.16 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() that allows authenticated users with media management permissions to delete arbitrary files by supplying filenames with directory traversal sequences. The method validates only the basename portion of the filename while preserving unvalidated directory paths containing ../ sequences that are passed to unlink(), enabling deletion of files outside the intended media storage directory.
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-896w-cw95-xq7w ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
- GHSA-896w-cw95-xq7w ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 2 ·
Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.