vulnerability / NVI-00008089 / Revision 3
ReactPHP's HTTP server parses encoded cookie names so malicious `__Host-` and `__Secure-` cookies can be sent
OSV carries this publisher advisory for react/http. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
1.206%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.68334. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
react/http
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0.7.0; fixed 1.7.0
### Impact In ReactPHP's HTTP server component versions below v1.7.0, when ReactPHP is processing incoming HTTP cookie values, the cookie names are url-decoded. This may lead to cookies with prefixes like `__Host-` and `__Secure-` confused with cookies that decode to such prefix, thus leading to an attacker being able to forge cookie which is supposed to be secure. See also CVE-2020-7070 and CVE-2020-8184 for more information. ### Patches * https://github.com/reactphp/http/commit/663c9a3b77b71463fa7fcb76a6676ffd16979dd6 - Fixed in reactphp/http `v1.7.0` ### Workarounds Infrastructure or DevOps can place a reverse proxy in front of the ReactPHP HTTP server to filter out any unexpected `Cookie` request headers. ### References * CVE-2020-7070, https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=79699 and https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/6559fe912661ca5ce5f0eeeb591d928451428ed0 * CVE-2020-8184, https://hackerone.com/reports/895727 and https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/1f5763de6a9fe515ff84992b343d63c88104654c * Originally introduced via https://github.com/reactphp/http/pull/175 ### Credits * Thanks to Marco Squarcina (TU Wien) for rep
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.7.0 for react/http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-w3w9-vrf5-8mx8 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2022-36032 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.