vulnerability / NVI-00008278 / Revision 3
Livewire Remote Code Execution on File Uploads
OSV carries this publisher advisory for livewire/livewire, livewire/livewire. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
0.846%
FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.58061. Missing scores are unknown.
As of · FIRST EPSS
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
livewire/livewire
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.0.0-beta.1; fixed 3.5.2
In livewire/livewire prior to `v2.12.7` and `v3.5.2`, the file extension of an uploaded file is guessed based on the MIME type. As a result, the actual file extension from the file name is not validated. An attacker can therefore bypass the validation by uploading a file with a valid MIME type (e.g., `image/png`) and a “.php” file extension. If the following criteria are met, the attacker can carry out an RCE attack: - Filename is composed of the original file name using `$file->getClientOriginalName()` - Files stored directly on your server in a public storage disk - Webserver is configured to execute “.php” files ### PoC In the following scenario, an attacker could upload a file called `shell.php` with an `image/png` MIME type and execute it on the remote server. ```php class SomeComponent extends Component { use WithFileUploads; #[Validate('image|extensions:png')] public $file; public function save() { $this->validate(); $this->file->storeAs( path: 'images', name: $this->file->getClientOriginalName(), options: ['disk' => 'public'], ); } } ```
livewire/livewire
source listedECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.12.7
In livewire/livewire prior to `v2.12.7` and `v3.5.2`, the file extension of an uploaded file is guessed based on the MIME type. As a result, the actual file extension from the file name is not validated. An attacker can therefore bypass the validation by uploading a file with a valid MIME type (e.g., `image/png`) and a “.php” file extension. If the following criteria are met, the attacker can carry out an RCE attack: - Filename is composed of the original file name using `$file->getClientOriginalName()` - Files stored directly on your server in a public storage disk - Webserver is configured to execute “.php” files ### PoC In the following scenario, an attacker could upload a file called `shell.php` with an `image/png` MIME type and execute it on the remote server. ```php class SomeComponent extends Component { use WithFileUploads; #[Validate('image|extensions:png')] public $file; public function save() { $this->validate(); $this->file->storeAs( path: 'images', name: $this->file->getClientOriginalName(), options: ['disk' => 'public'], ); } } ```
03 / Response
What to do next
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.5.2 for livewire/livewire. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- vendor patch
The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.12.7 for livewire/livewire. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database via OSV
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. FIRST EPSS
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-f3cx-396f-7jqp ↗
GitHub Advisory Database via OSV · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.
- CVE-2024-47823 ↗
FIRST EPSS · official catalog
Observed . FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 3 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 2 ·
Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.