supply chain event / NVI-00008348 / Revision 1
Malicious code in net-codec-testmetest (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for net-codec-testmetest. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
net-codec-testmetest
source listed= 1.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (7bf1dbafca56ccfcb849f9ebb80b7a1cdf42007fd12618492620e0f7660476b2) The package has no native source files but ships a binding.gyp whose sole target is type:'none' and whose sources array uses GYP command expansion (`<!(env node index.js...)`) to execute index.js during `node-gyp rebuild`, which npm invokes automatically whenever a binding.gyp is present. index.js is a Caesar-cipher-obfuscated IIFE whose decoded body imports node:crypto, reads the shipped data.bin blob, AES-128-GCM-decrypts it with hardcoded key/iv/aad, brotli-decompresses the result into a temporary file, and spawns that file under the Bun runtime (declared as the package's only dependency). The combination — binding.gyp with no native sources used purely as an install-time execution smuggler, an obfuscated eval-based loader, and an opaque encrypted payload executed under an alternate runtime — is a packed dropper with no legitimate function for a stated utility library. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/f17c406fb7ee5243da902499814340765fd9b86a/osv/malicious/npm/net-codec-testmetest/MAL-2026-18186
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-g4jf-x8gh-87jw ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.