supply chain event / NVI-00008364 / Revision 1
Malicious code in @ppa-web-components/ppa-builder (npm)
GitHub lists this malware advisory for @ppa-web-components/ppa-builder, @ppa-web-components/ppa-builder, @ppa-web-components/ppa-builder, @ppa-web-components/ppa-builder, @ppa-web-components/ppa-builder. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.
This report has not inspected your inventory, configuration, deployed build, reachability or evidence. A catalog listing and a severity score do not establish exposure or compromise.
01 / Meaning
Why it matters
Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.
02 / Applicability
The affected context
Affected versions, configuration prerequisites and known exclusions are public. Confirm each one against the deployed service.
@ppa-web-components/ppa-builder
source listed= 99.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (cc4615498b50aa4b5f39a8367c44e6a18d4a7272ae71235716a152b2933d5ddd) The package is described as a 'Compatibility shim' and ships a stub Proxy-based main plus beacon.cjs. The package.json declares scripts.postinstall: 'node beacon.cjs', and the main entry also invokes the same fire() routine on require. On both triggers, beacon.cjs collects installer identifiers — os.hostname(), __dirname (install path), process.cwd(), process.version, and the package name — and POSTs them in cleartext to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The destination is not a registry, publisher, or any documented infrastructure; it is a plain-HTTP bare IP with no TLS. An inline source comment states that a build that completes and calls back is cleaner evidence, confirming the artifact's purpose is to signal successful resolution and execution on installer machines. Combined with a scoped name resembling an internal namespace and no real library functionality, this matches the dependency-confusion / namesquat callback-probe shape. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/bl
@ppa-web-components/ppa-builder
source listed= 1.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (cc4615498b50aa4b5f39a8367c44e6a18d4a7272ae71235716a152b2933d5ddd) The package is described as a 'Compatibility shim' and ships a stub Proxy-based main plus beacon.cjs. The package.json declares scripts.postinstall: 'node beacon.cjs', and the main entry also invokes the same fire() routine on require. On both triggers, beacon.cjs collects installer identifiers — os.hostname(), __dirname (install path), process.cwd(), process.version, and the package name — and POSTs them in cleartext to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The destination is not a registry, publisher, or any documented infrastructure; it is a plain-HTTP bare IP with no TLS. An inline source comment states that a build that completes and calls back is cleaner evidence, confirming the artifact's purpose is to signal successful resolution and execution on installer machines. Combined with a scoped name resembling an internal namespace and no real library functionality, this matches the dependency-confusion / namesquat callback-probe shape. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/bl
@ppa-web-components/ppa-builder
source listed= 0.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (cc4615498b50aa4b5f39a8367c44e6a18d4a7272ae71235716a152b2933d5ddd) The package is described as a 'Compatibility shim' and ships a stub Proxy-based main plus beacon.cjs. The package.json declares scripts.postinstall: 'node beacon.cjs', and the main entry also invokes the same fire() routine on require. On both triggers, beacon.cjs collects installer identifiers — os.hostname(), __dirname (install path), process.cwd(), process.version, and the package name — and POSTs them in cleartext to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The destination is not a registry, publisher, or any documented infrastructure; it is a plain-HTTP bare IP with no TLS. An inline source comment states that a build that completes and calls back is cleaner evidence, confirming the artifact's purpose is to signal successful resolution and execution on installer machines. Combined with a scoped name resembling an internal namespace and no real library functionality, this matches the dependency-confusion / namesquat callback-probe shape. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/bl
@ppa-web-components/ppa-builder
source listed= 2.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (cc4615498b50aa4b5f39a8367c44e6a18d4a7272ae71235716a152b2933d5ddd) The package is described as a 'Compatibility shim' and ships a stub Proxy-based main plus beacon.cjs. The package.json declares scripts.postinstall: 'node beacon.cjs', and the main entry also invokes the same fire() routine on require. On both triggers, beacon.cjs collects installer identifiers — os.hostname(), __dirname (install path), process.cwd(), process.version, and the package name — and POSTs them in cleartext to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The destination is not a registry, publisher, or any documented infrastructure; it is a plain-HTTP bare IP with no TLS. An inline source comment states that a build that completes and calls back is cleaner evidence, confirming the artifact's purpose is to signal successful resolution and execution on installer machines. Combined with a scoped name resembling an internal namespace and no real library functionality, this matches the dependency-confusion / namesquat callback-probe shape. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/bl
@ppa-web-components/ppa-builder
source listed= 1.0.1
## Source: amazon-inspector (cc4615498b50aa4b5f39a8367c44e6a18d4a7272ae71235716a152b2933d5ddd) The package is described as a 'Compatibility shim' and ships a stub Proxy-based main plus beacon.cjs. The package.json declares scripts.postinstall: 'node beacon.cjs', and the main entry also invokes the same fire() routine on require. On both triggers, beacon.cjs collects installer identifiers — os.hostname(), __dirname (install path), process.cwd(), process.version, and the package name — and POSTs them in cleartext to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The destination is not a registry, publisher, or any documented infrastructure; it is a plain-HTTP bare IP with no TLS. An inline source comment states that a build that completes and calls back is cleaner evidence, confirming the artifact's purpose is to signal successful resolution and execution on installer machines. Combined with a scoped name resembling an internal namespace and no real library functionality, this matches the dependency-confusion / namesquat callback-probe shape. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/bl
@ppa-web-components/ppa-builder
source listed= 3.0.0
## Source: amazon-inspector (cc4615498b50aa4b5f39a8367c44e6a18d4a7272ae71235716a152b2933d5ddd) The package is described as a 'Compatibility shim' and ships a stub Proxy-based main plus beacon.cjs. The package.json declares scripts.postinstall: 'node beacon.cjs', and the main entry also invokes the same fire() routine on require. On both triggers, beacon.cjs collects installer identifiers — os.hostname(), __dirname (install path), process.cwd(), process.version, and the package name — and POSTs them in cleartext to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://185.158.107.175:8787/_ah/dc. The destination is not a registry, publisher, or any documented infrastructure; it is a plain-HTTP bare IP with no TLS. An inline source comment states that a build that completes and calls back is cleaner evidence, confirming the artifact's purpose is to signal successful resolution and execution on installer machines. Combined with a scoped name resembling an internal namespace and no real library functionality, this matches the dependency-confusion / namesquat callback-probe shape. --- Credit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/bl
03 / Response
What to do next
- investigate
Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.
Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system. GitHub Advisory Database
A fixed release is not deployment evidence.
Check current vendor support and compatibility. After making a change, verify the deployed build and relevant runtime conditions. Keep the evidence, owner and time. An updated lockfile alone does not prove what is running.
04 / Limits
What this report cannot establish
- Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.
05 / Provenance
Sources you can inspect
Each assertion retains its source. Mirrored records may repeat one underlying publisher; additional links are not independent corroboration.
- GHSA-gpx7-mx94-wfv3 ↗
GitHub Advisory Database · vendor advisory
Observed . GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.
Public revision history
Only published revisions appear here. Routine fetches do not create a material-change event.
- Revision 1 ·
First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.